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This thesis seeks to trace the origins and initial Republic of Korea (ROK) strategy 
in space policy and to analyze the prospects and challenges of building effective and 
sustainable civil, commercial, and military space capabilities. To better understand the 
factors involved in developing a sustainable ROK space program, two sets of 
comparative case studies, both internal and external cases, are examined. The internal 
case studies consist of the ROK automobile and semiconductor industries, and the 
external case studies are of Israel’s and Australia’s space programs. The ROK space 
program exhibits considerable differences from the internal and external case studies in 
terms of policy direction, R&D investment, and human resources. Based on these 
findings, this thesis derives several conclusions. In order to take a path toward a 
sustainable space program, the ROK should redefine national needs and aspirations for its 
space activities; plan to expand private investment, especially in space R&D; invest in the 
space sector with a long-term vision; and continue to strengthen ties with international 
partners, especially its main ally, the United States. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary question addressed in this thesis is: What are the challenges and 
opportunities facing the Republic of Korea (ROK) in policy-making and investment for 
establishing a sustainable space program in a highly competitive region and international 
space marketplace? This thesis seeks to identify and explain the origins and initial 
strategy behind the space policies and programs of the ROK and the prospects and 
challenges of building a set of effective and sustainable civil, commercial, and military 
space capabilities. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
The space program of the ROK began in the late1980s in earnest. Its starting point 
lagged behind those of other space-faring nations by almost 30 years; however, despite its 
late beginning, the ROK’s civil space development has proceeded rapidly. To date, the 
ROK has launched twenty objects successfully by foreign rockets and one of its own into 
outer space since 1992.1 Without a doubt, the ROK is a new player in space activity, and 
according to James C. Moltz, “[it] has arguably been even more dynamic [than others] 
over the past two decades,” in its space development.2 While other space-faring nations 
started their space programs or were concerned about space in the 1950s, the ROK could 
not afford to start a space program at that time. The ROK’s economic, educational, and 
technological status also held the ROK back. After the 1970s, the ROK was able to invest 
in efforts to build up its infrastructure for scientific and technological industries. The 
ROK’s investment was initially made possible due to its own domestic development 
plans, such as the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, and international support, 
                                                 
1 United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, “Online Index of Objects Launched into Outer 





2 James Clay Moltz, Asia’s Space Race (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 136. 
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especially from the Unites States. Recently, the Korea Aerospace Research Institute 
(KARI), which took the lead in the ROK’s aerospace science and technology 
development, announced that it “successfully launched a small satellite in low-earth orbit 
(LEO) on January 30, 2013,”3 plans to “develop an independent space launch vehicle into 
LEO”4 through the Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-II) before March 2021, and will 
launch a lunar lander in 2020 and a Mars lander in 2030. Furthermore, the ROK seeks to 
establish a stable commercial program and develop military space capabilities to ensure 
its security from possible external threats. 
Yet the future of the ROK’s space development does not all glitter like gold. 
While the ROK is considered as one of the leading world industrial powers, there are 
obvious obstacles blocking the ROK’s path toward sustainable growth and development 
in space. First, the ROK has fewer budgetary and human resources than neighboring 
countries, such as China, Russia, and Japan. Next, the international space marketplace 
has high barriers to entry due to its small size and tough price competitiveness. Moreover, 
restrictions imposed by space superpower nations on sharing space technologies, such as 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and missile range restrictions, have 
been a barrier to the ROK’s development of space capabilities, so the ROK cannot enjoy 
advantages similar to what Japan and China once received from the United States and the 
Soviet Union. 
In this context, this research on sustainability of the ROK’s space development is 
significant for three reasons. First, the ROK’s sustainable entry into space could 
contribute to regional and international security and stability. East Asia is a region with a 
dilemma that cooperation coexists with competition among nations in terms of politics, 
economy, and society as well as space. Moreover, the region consists of world’s leading 
powers, including China, Japan, and Russia. By presenting its space development 
objectives clearly, an unnecessary space arms race could be prevented, and peaceful 
space development could be promoted. 
                                                 
3 Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “First Korean Space Launch Vehicle Naroho (KSLV-I),” 
accessed March 4, 2016, http://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_03_02.do.  
4 Korea Aerospace Research Institute, “Korea Space Launch Vehicle KSLV-II,” accessed March 4, 
2016, http://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_03_01.do.  
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Second, the ROK could play a significant role by sharing the high-cost burden of 
space-based operational information as one side of the ROK-US alliance based on 
enhancement of mutual space military capabilities. To date, the ROK has received major 
support from the U.S. in space operations. The ROK’s military power has been increased 
considerably due to space information, such as reconnaissance imagery and weather data 
provided by the U.S. and by the utilization of GPS satellites for military purposes.  
Finally, the ROK’s space development could provide an example for other states 
to follow in developing a model of sustainable space activities. A number of developing 
space countries have increased their space activities through rockets and satellites, built 
space systems and supporting infrastructure to defend themselves from space threats, and 
pursued the leading spacefaring nations with their technology development and 
competitive market edge. However, like the ROK, several nations overstate their future 
space potential. Thus, the ROK’s development of an effective and sustainable space 
development plan could serve as an example for them. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
1. Definition of Sustainability 
Most studies regarding space sustainability focus on challenges to the peaceful 
and enduring use of space.5 For example, the Secure World Foundation defines space 
sustainability as follows: 
Space sustainability is ensuring that all humanity can continue to use outer 
space for peaceful purposes and socioeconomic benefit now and in the 
long term. This will require international cooperation, discussion, and 
agreements designed to ensure that outer space is safe, secure and 
peaceful.6 
The U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) also uses a 
similar meaning for space sustainability. According to NASA’s Sustainability Portal, the 
objective of NASA’s sustainability policy is as follows: 
                                                 
5 “Space Sustainability 101,” Secure World Foundation, accessed June 4, 2016, http://swfound.org/
space-sustainability-101/; Timiebi Aganaba-Jeanty, “Space Sustainability and the Freedom of Outer 
Space,” Astropolitics 14, no. 1, 10–11.  
6 “Space Sustainability 101,” Secure World Foundation. 
 4 
NASA’s sustainability policy is to execute NASA’s mission without 
compromising our planet’s resources so that future generations can meet 
their needs. Sustainability involves taking action now to enable a future 
where the environment and living conditions are protected and enhanced.7 
In order to achieve this objective, NASA stresses the fact that “NASA seeks to 
use public funds efficiently and effectively, promote the health of the planet, and operate 
in a way that benefits our neighbors.”8  
However, these studies’ concept of space sustainability is focused on the activities 
of major space powers. Developing countries’ concerns about space activities are focused 
more on their ability to enter the international system and space marketplace and to 
stabilize their position in the system. Their interests are more dynamic and focused on 
development rather than the sustained use of a stable system that has been established 
already.  
The report of the World Commission on Environment and Development created 
by the United Nations General Assembly, “Our Common Future,” provides a definition 
of sustainable development as follows: 
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs … In essence, sustainable development is a process of 
change in which the exploitation of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development; and 
institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and 
future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.9 
This thesis draws on this concept of sustainable development to examine the 
space activity of the ROK, whose program is not yet mature enough to have effects on 
broader space sustainability. The sustainability of space development is defined here as a 
process of setting policy objectives, capital investment, and development of human 
                                                 
7 “Sustainability 101,” NASA’s Sustainability Portal, accessed June 4, 2016, http://www.nasa.gov/
agency/sustainability/#.V1OSkITrtFQ.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Gru Brundtland, Mansour Khalid, Susanna Agnelli, et al., “Our Common Future,” the U.N. General 
Assembly, The World Commission on Environment and Development Report, May 21, 1987, 27–28. 
http://www.channelingreality.com/Documents/Brundtland_Searchable.pdf.   
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resources to meet the needs of a nation in its space activities in an efficient manner in 
harmony with the country’s long-term support capabilities. 
2. ROK Space Development 
a. Aspirations for Space and ROK Motivations 
Many scholars have examined on national motivations for space development. 
However, it is not easy to discriminate such motivations because the analysis requires 
extensive and comprehensive understanding across the political, economic, and social 
background of a nation. Fortunately, scholars sort the motivations into three or four 
categories to make it easier to approach. John Logsdon distinguishes the motivations for 
space activities briefly. In 1983, Logsdon pointed out the list of motivations as “scientific 
discovery, national security, national image, and beneficial applications.” 10  Yet 
presenting the four motivations, the author simplified the factors later into “science, 
security, and society” as the dominant motivations for human space activities.11 
Moltz also sheds lights on these motivations. The author argues that the nation’s 
orbital motivations have three distinct goals focused on “scientific-technological progress, 
national security, and international prestige,” and these goals are related to each other.12 
Furthermore, the author claims the ROK’s motivations are: (1) economic development 
aims and state-led industrial development as with other industrial sectors in the past, (2) 
security concerns created by threats of North Korea’s nuclear and missile developments, 
and (3) the desire for national pride and to become a technologically advanced society.13 
Hyoung Joon An asserts that the ROK’s motivations have changed over time. 
According to the author’s argument, the ROK’s goals for space development are 
“modernity” through progress in scientific-technology (1958-69), “self-defense” concerns 
                                                 
10 John Logsdon, “The Motivations for Space Activities,” in The First 25 Years in Space. A 
Symposium, ed. Allan A. Needell (Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, DC, 1983), 4. 
11 Ibid.  
12 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 25.   
13 Ibid., 137–8.  
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about national security (1970-84), “economic security” (1985-97), and “national prestige” 
(1998-2013).14 
A nation’s official purposes and goals for space activities are expressed at its 
national acts and plans regarding space development. The ROK’s historic space policies 
consist of two acts and five plans: the Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act of 
1987; the Space Development Promotion Act of 2005; the Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan 
for Space Development of 1996; the Space Development Promotion Act of 2005; the 
First Basic Plan to Promote Space Development of 2007; the Second Basic Plan to 
Promote Space Development of 2001; and the Mid- to Long- Term Space Development 
Plan of 2013.  
According to these documents, the Acts’ priorities shifted their focus from the 
airplane industry to the space industry. The Aerospace Industry Development Promotion 
Act of 1987 states its purpose to contribute to national economic development by 
promoting the aerospace industry, science, and technology.15 On the other hand, the 
Space Development Promotion Act of 2005 was established to 
facilitate the peaceful use and scientific exploration of outer space and to 
contribute to national security, the sound growth of the national economy, 
and the betterment of life of citizens through the systematic promotion of 
the development of outer space and the efficient use and management of 
space objects.16 
Meanwhile, the ROK’s space plans’ objectives have evolved from general to 
specific, maintaining their purposes to acquire independent technological capabilities for 
space activities. One of the plans’ ultimate goals was “to join the top 10 countries in the 
space industry by competing in the global market.”17 Afterward, the goals concerned the 
                                                 
14 Hyoung Joon An, “National Aspirations, Imaged Futures, and Space Exploration: the Origin and 
Development of Korean Space Program 1958–2013,” Dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology 
(December 2015), 208. 
15 Korea National Law Information Center, “Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act,” last 
modified January 28, 2015, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/항공우주산업개발촉진법. 
16 Korea National Law Information Center, “Space Development Promotion Act,” last modified 
January 20, 2015, http://www.law.go.kr/법령/우주개발%20진흥법.    
17 KARI, “Planning of Mid- and Long-term National Space Development Plan,” Korea Ministry of 
Science, ICT and Future Planning, last modified December 10, 2013, 186.  
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expansion of infrastructure, financing and investment plans, research and development, 
international cooperation, management of space objects, extension of civil participation, 
and high-quality human resources.18 
Based on these motivations and policies, the ROK has extended its space 
capabilities thus far; there is no difference in the views among scholars about the fact that 
the ROK has achieved remarkable progress in space development despite its short history 
of space activity compared to neighboring space-faring nations. Certainly, the ROK has 
taken latecomer’s incentives and succeeded in its catch-up strategy throughout its space 
industries, but a debate has emerged about the advantages and disadvantages of the 
ROK’s space activities as a latecomer. 
b. Economic Latecomer 
The concept of latecomers was elaborated by an economic historian, Alexander 
Gerschenkron, in 1962. The author had studied Europe on countries like Germany in 19th-
century as a case of late industrializing country that wanted to catch up the other 
industrialized countries such as England. Gerschenkron claims that “borrowed 
technology…was one of the primary factors assuring a high speed of development in a 
backward country entering the stage of industrialization.” 19  Furthermore, the author 
stressed the important role of the state’s institutions to ensure its development with those 
borrowed technologies.20  
Based on this idea of economic latecomer, John A. Mathews elaborates these 
thoughts by analysis of latecomer firm behavior and strategy to catch-up with leading 
firms. While Mathews focused on technological aspects of latecomer development in his 
early work, the author enlarged latecomer’s features in his article, “Catch-up Strategies 
and the Latecomer Effect in Industrial Development,” by discussing international 
                                                 
18 Korea Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, “Mid to Long Term Space Development Plan.” 
accessed March 9, 2016, 11; Korea Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, “Second Basic Plan to 
Promote Space Development.” accessed March 5, 2016, 12.  
19 Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays 
(Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962), 8. 
20 Ibid., 354.  
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position, changes on industrial structure, involvement of value chains, institutional and 
economic learning, firm and industrial creation, and so on.21 
Linsu Kim also claims that the technical development trajectories in latecomer 
country are different from those of developed countries.22 The author uses an institutional 
environment framework to analyze a complex learning process for technological capacity 
acquisition in latecomer countries. Kim asserts that technological capability acquisition is 
through “interactions with the international community, interactions with domestic 
community, and in-house efforts.”23 Furthermore, Kim shed lights on the fact that this 
process is affected by five factors: (1) the market environment, such as export-oriented 
and protected import systems, (2) policies by the government that affect the adoption of 
foreign technology, support institutions, and the quality of education, (3) the educational 
system for the future, (4) the sociocultural environment, and (5) organization and 
management.24 
Regarding path of the ROK’s space technology development, Chin Young Hwang 
stresses that the ROK’s historical path is similar to that in other industries.25 The author 
sheds light on the path as three stages: (1) contracting with foreign companies to develop 
a space system, (2) developing the system under the ROK’s responsibility with 
supporting of foreign companies, and (3) developing the system independently. 26 
Moreover, introducing recent space development activities of the ROK, such as satellites 
and launcher development, Won-hwa Park claims that the ROK adopted a “two-track 
                                                 
21 John A. Mathews, “Competitive Advantage of the Latecomer Firm: A Resource-Based Account of 
Industrial Catch-Up Strategies,” Asia Pacific Journal of Management 19, no. 4 (December, 2002): 472; 
John A. Mathews, “Catch-up Strategies and the Latecomer Effect in Industrial Development,” New 
Political Economy 11 no.3 (2006): 325–27.  
22 Linsu Kim, Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Korea Technological Learning 
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1997), 91. 
23 Ibid., 91–94. 
24 Ibid., 94. 
25 Chin Young Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea-History, Current Programs and Future Plans,” 
Space Policy 22 (2006): 194.  
26 Ibid., 199.  
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approach” to gain its space technology in the early 1990s. 27 The two-track approach 
included:  
One relying on foreign technology to manufacture and place in orbit 
communications satellites, another to foster indigenous technology, 
starting with small satellites and launching them into low-Earth 
orbit(LEO), through technology cooperation programs with the other 
space-faring nations.28 
c. Government-Led Development 
The ROK government has played a key role in space industrial development. 
Initially, infrastructure, institutions, and facilities related to space activities were 
established by the ROK government. KARI (formerly affiliated with the Korea Institute 
of Machinery and Materials), which leads the ROK space activities, was founded in 1989. 
The SatReC Initiative (SatReC-I) which is the ROK’s leading commercial provider was 
founded as a subsidiary institution of Korea Advanced Institute of Science and 
Technology (KAIST, affiliated to MSIP) in 1999.  
Subsequently, the ROK government made efforts to adopt foreign technology. 
The ROK’s first satellite, the KITSAT-1 (Uribyul-1), which is for scientific 
experimentation, education of students, and testing next generation technology, was 
developed through collaboration program between KAIST and the University of Surrey, 
UK, in 1992. 29 The first Korea Multi-purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT, Arirang-1) was 
developed by KARI in association with the U.S. company, TRW.30 In addition to these 
efforts to adopt foreign satellite technologies, the ROK government stimulated its space 
launch vehicles and a launch facility development by the conclusion of two bilateral 
agreements with the Russian Federation in 2006 and 2007. The agreements states as their 
purpose goals “to promote mutually beneficial scientific, technological, industrial, 
economic and other cooperation related to the exploration and use of outer space for 
                                                 
27 Won-hwa Park, “Recent Space Developments in South Korea,” Space Policy 26 (2010), 117.  
28 Ibid.  
29 Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea,” 197; Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 141–42. 
30 KARI, “Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (Arirang),” accessed March 8, 2016, http://www.kari.re.kr/
eng/sub03_02_01.do; Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 144.  
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peaceful purposes” and “to establish cooperative relations with regard to technology 
safeguards in connection with the implementation of joint programs and projects in the 
field of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”31  
Ultimately, the ROK’s satellites series, such as KITSAT, KOMPSAT, and 
Geostationary Earth Orbit Satellite, Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-I), and the 
NARO Space Center were developed and have been operated by ROK government-led 
programs. 
Within this infrastructure, SatRec-I has played an important role to develop the 
ROK’s space capabilities. SI was separated from KAIST and commercialized in 2009 
when KAIST was incorporated with SatReC. SatReC has participated in foreign satellite 
programs, such as the Malaysian RazakSat in 2009, the UAE DubaiSat-1 and -2 in 2009, 
2013, and the Spanish Deimos-2 in 2014.32 Moreover, the company offers three core 
technologies for small Earth observation satellites, including satellite platforms, mission 
payloads, and ground component technologies. 
d. Problems Facing the ROK’s Space Development 
Some scholars point out problems facing the ROK’s space development. One of 
the schools claims that late- developing countries like the ROK face obstacles in trying to 
establish sustainable space industries. U. M. Leloglu and E. Kocaoglan assert the problem 
that the only initially available market for late-developing spacefaring countries is their 
own domestic one, but it is hard to meet its national needs and compete successfully with 
foreign companies which already have high-level space technologies and protection and 
                                                 
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK, “Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of 
Korea and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field of the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes,” entered into force September 5, 2006; “Agreement Between the 
Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the Russian Federation on Technology 
Safeguards Associated with Cooperation in the Field of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for 
Peaceful Purposes,” entered into force Jul 17, 2007. http://www.mofa.go.kr/search/
search.jsp?searchData=우주.  
32 SatReC Initiative, “Mission List,” accessed May 20, 2016, https://www.satreci.com/eng/
ds1_1.html?tno=8.   
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support by their governments to apply political pressure.33 The authors give an example 
by quoting the Green Paper on European Space Policy,  
The United States in particular protect their industry from external 
commercial pressures thanks to support from a large national security and 
defense market which is closed to foreign suppliers. Application to 
commercial civil satellites of export control law—notably the application 
of clauses related to dual-use technologies—reinforces this support.34 
Another school cites problems from internal circumstances. Joosung J. Lee and 
Seungmi Chung argue in their article, “Space policy for late comer countries: A case 
study of South Korea,” that the problem of the ROK’s space development is in its 
institutional policy. Their argument is that KARI has to change its role.35 The ROK’s 
space policy was focused on “technology catch-up” initially without deeper consideration 
of a space industrial development plan and strategy for later on. 36 Accordingly, the 
market size of the ROK’s commercial space industry is heavily focused on satellite 
application up to 72%, which has created a weak foundation for the space industry.37 
This problem leads to another concern, which is that most companies’ needs are 
concentrated on satellite applications, while research institutes and universities are 
focused on manufacturing satellites, launch vehicles, and ground-based systems. 38 
Moreover, the ROK’s space industry environment is difficult for private enterprise due to 
high costs and limited accessibility to experimental facilities.39 Thus, Lee and Chung 
argue that the main problem facing the ROK’s space program is the absence of an 
institute like the U.S. NASA and JAXA of Japan, which have the role of encouraging 
                                                 
33 U. M. Leloglu and E. Kocaoglan, “Establishing Space Industry in Developing Countries: 
Opportunities and Difficulties,” Advances in Space Research 42, no. 11 (December 01, 2008), 1882.  
34 Ibid.  
35 Joosung J. Lee and Seungmi Chung, “Space Policy for Late Comer Countries: a Case Study of 
South Korea,” Space Policy 27, no.4 (2011): 227.  
36 Ibid.  
37 Lee and Chung, “Space Policy for Late Comer Countries,” 230.  
38 Ibid.  
39 Ibid.   
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technology transfer and equipment sharing and acting as a moderator for communication 
between companies.40 
On the other hand, Chin Young Hwang and Jeongwon Lee, et al. argue the 
problem is that the ROK government gives immoderate value to hardware products. The 
authors assert that the ROK has developed mainly hardware-oriented space technologies, 
such as the satellites and rockets developed by the space technologies on which the ROK 
government policy concentrated.41 The Mid- to Long-term National Space Development 
Plan, which is the most recently announced, supports this assertion. The Plan pronounces 
its objectives as guaranteed independent space access and continuous development of 
satellites through the private sector’s participation. Even though the Plan mentions a 
guarantee of competitiveness for space development, such as scientific-technology and 
manned missions, the ROK has been closed to reopening its astronaut program after its 
only one female space flight participant visited the International Space Station for 11 
days in 2008; there are no more planned astronauts. 
In addition, some scholars point out the ROK’s meagerness in military space 
capability and applications. Moltz emphasizes that the trend of space programs in Asia 
usually has begun with civilian applications first then turned to military use, in contrast to 
the space superpowers’ case.42 On this point, Wade Huntley also asserts that smaller 
powers countries typically pursue opportunities in the realm of civil space collaboration 
first, and then shift their focus to military space applications.43 Futron, which is a U.S. 
consulting firm that publishes a Space Competitiveness Index for space-faring nations 
annually, also indicates “limited military space assets and organization” as one of the 
                                                 
40 Ibid.  
41 Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea, 199; Jeongwon Lee, Hyun-jung Jo, and Jae Dong Choi, “The 
Organizations for Space Education and Outreach Programs in the Republic of Korea,” Acta Astronautica 
69 (2011): 730.  
42 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 27. 
43 Wade L. Huntley, “Smaller State Perspectives on the Future of Space Governance,” Astropolitics 5, 
no. 3 (2007), 257.  
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weaknesses facing the ROK’s space program.44 But the ROK is on its way to try to 
acquire independent military capabilities. A plan for five military-purpose surveillance 
satellites by the early 2020s is ongoing, although realization of the plan is blurred by 
budgetary problems. Furthermore, Tae-Hyung Kim argues that the ROK’s military space 
plan, led by the ROK Air Force (ROKAF), has not progressed as expected. The author 
points out the obstacles as  
lack of coordination with the civilian authority, bureaucratic wrangling 
within the military in prioritizing each other’s project, budgetary 
limitations, lack of public awareness and support, and shortage of sound 
plans due to lack of productive debate.45 
 Daniel A. Pinkston asserts that the ROK has been reluctant to launch its own 
military satellites despite the fact that the ROK has a major interest in satellite technology 
for military purpose.46 The author quotes an interview with Dr. Park Jin, a member of the 
ROK National Assembly’s National Defense Committee, stating that the reason the ROK 
is reluctant to move into military applications is that launching independent military 
reconnaissance satellites is expensive and could harm the ROK–US alliance.47 
3. SUCCESS IN THE PAST 
The ROK’s drive toward space industrial power is in many respects comparable 
to past cases of the ROK government’s targeting of specific manufacturing industries. A 
number of studies deal with the ROK’s successful economic development through a 
 
                                                 
44 Futron, Developing Japanese Space Competitiveness: Perspectives from Futron’s 2009 Space 
Competitiveness Index(SCI), Keynote address to Japan’s Institute for Unmanned Space Experiment Free 
Flyer (USEF) Seventh Space Industry Symposium (December 2009), 30. 
45 Tae-Hyung Kim, “South Korea’s Space Policy and Its National Security Implications,” The Korean 
Journal of Defense Analysis 22, no. 4 (December 2010): 524.   
46 Daniel A. Pinkston, “North and South Korean Space Development: Prospects for Cooperation and 
Conflict,” Astropolitics 4, no. 2 (2006): 216. 
47 Ibid.  
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catch-up strategy and adopting latecomer’s incentives in such manufacturing industries as 
automobiles, semiconductors, and shipbuilding.48 
First of all, the Competitive Industrial Performance Report 2014 published by the 
United Nation Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) ranks the ROK’s 
competitive industrial performance fourth worldwide, following Germany, Japan, and the 
United States since 2010.49 Its rank has risen gradually from seventeenth in 1990 to sixth 
in 2005.50 The report uses the Competitive Industrial Performance (CIP) index to assess 
and benchmark the industrial competitiveness of individual countries. Industrial 
competitiveness is defined as “the capacity of countries to increase their presence in 
international and domestic markets whilst simultaneously developing industrial sectors 
and activities with higher value added and technological content”51 The report insists, 
given the country’s significant number of medium- and high-tech industries, that the 
ROK’s manufacturing sector is competitive.52 
The Development Centre Studies of (OECD) analyze the ROK’s technological 
catch-up and skills development in the report, Industrial Policy and Territorial 
Development: Lessons from Korea. According to these studies, the ROK’s catch-up 
strategy has four major elements:  
(1) Multi-annual planning with clear targeted and associated budget, (2) 
targeted measures to support national industries, including support to 
domestic firms, development of skills, infrastructure building and import 
                                                 
48 Eunhee Sohn,et al., “Technological Catching-up and Latecomer Strategy: A Case Study of the 
Asian Shipbuilding Industry,” Seoul Journal of Business 15, no. 2 (Dec 2009); Dong-Sung Cho, et al., 
“Latecomer Strategies: Evidence from the Semiconductor Industry in Japan and Korea,” Organization 
Science 9, no.4(1998); Dong-Ok Lee, et al., “The Korean Automobile Industry - Challenges and 
Strategies in the Global Market,” Journal of International Marketing 4, no. 4 (1996), 85; Annalisa Primi 
et al., Industrial Policy and Territorial Development: Lessons From Korea (Paris: OECD Pub., 2012), 
35–36.  
49 UNIDO (2015), Competitive Industrial Performance Report 2014, Research, Statistics and 
Industrial Policy Branch Working Paper of United Nation Industrial Development Organization, Vienna, 
12. 
50 Ibid., 12.  
51 UNIDO, Competitive Industrial Performance Report 2014, 2. 
52 Ibid., 11.  
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controls, (3) export promotion measures, and (4) management of capital 
markets.53  
Among those elements, the report emphasizes the Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan which was established by the ROK government consecutive seven 
times from 1962 to 1992 as a major policy instrument of the ROK’s catch-up strategy 
because the Plans set clear goals and promoted harmonized actions across several 
domestic capabilities.54  
Moreover, on the technological catch-up and skills development, the success of 
the ROK’s catch-up strategy has been possible through factors “linking technology 
policies with industrial policy, rising private investment in R&D, and continuous 
upgrading of human capital and skills,” the authors claim.55 First, the ROK made several 
steps toward technology-intensive activities: learning from foreign practices, creating 
government research institutes, and investing R&D funds into the private sector, 
especially the chaebols.56 Next, the ROK increased its investment in R&D for the private 
sector by more than 70% of total R&D expenditures in 2009, while 60% of it was for the 
government in 1970s. 57  Finally, the ROK has fostered human capital and skills by 
programs such as the Brain Korea 21 and efforts to increase the number of researchers 
and engineers. 58  To be specific, the OECD Development Centre notes the ROK’s 
automobile and semiconductor industries as successful cases. Its automobile industry 
started with promotion acts, and then followed typical latecomer’s development steps 
adopting foreign technologies first and producing cars independently later.59 Moreover, 
several institutional efforts, such as import restrictions, an automobile industry promotion 
                                                 
53 Annalisa Primi et al., Industrial Policy and Territorial Development: Lessons From Korea (Paris: 
OECD Pub., 2012), 29.  
54 Ibid., 30.  
55 Ibid., 41–53.  
56 Ibid., 41–42.  
57 Ibid., 47.  
58 Ibid., 49–50.  
59 Ibid., 35.  
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plan, and private R&D support were made by government. 60  Meanwhile, its 
semiconductor industry has had similar support, such as R&D resources, establishment of 
the Law of the Promotion of the Electronic Industry, and formulation of the Plan of 
Fostering the Electronics Company. 61  Moreover, the ROK has invested in the 
semiconductor industry indirectly through establishment of the Semiconductor Design 
Training Center for the purpose of developing highly skilled human resources.62 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
According to the literature review, the following facts are clear: (1) the ROK has 
made successful progress in its economic growth through its manufacturing industries, (2) 
the ROK has a strong will to develop its civil, commercial, and military space programs 
with a catch-up strategy, (3) even though the ROK is motivated in part by security 
concerns, its space development has been focused on civil and commercial activities, and 
(4) the ROK faces a difficult situation caused by internal and external factors.  
However, the literature on the ROK’s space policies and programs fails to answer 
the following questions:  
(1) Does the ROK’s space industry have the same features or follow the same 
trajectory as other industries in terms of a catch-up strategy? 
(2) If so, where does the ROK’s space development stand? 
(3) If not, what factors make it different?  
(4) How has the ROK invested in military space capability? and  
(5) What strategy should the ROK choose to build a sustainable military space 
capability?  
These questions are important for examining the sustainability of the ROK’s 
space development in an efficient manner in harmony with the country’s long-term 
support capabilities.  
                                                 
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid., 35–36.  
62 Ibid., 36.  
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On the other hand, a space industry itself is difficult to compare with other 
domestic industrial developments directly because of complicated considerations in terms 
of politics or military. Thus, in order to diagnose military space sustainability of the ROK, 
it is necessary to use a comparison with cases of other countries’ space activities. 
The hypotheses about these questions are that  
 The ROK’s space development has had a trajectory similar to other successful 
industries, but insufficient efforts have been made in some areas, such as 
policy direction and R&D investment, especially by the private sector. 
 The ROK has promising opportunities in space development due to the 
strength of its technological competitiveness in niche markets.  
 While the ROK has invested in certain, independent military space 
capabilities, it will be best served－in terms of sustainability－by maintaining 
a certain level of cooperation and engagement with its major ally, the United 
States. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
Two comparative case studies, internal and external cases, will be examined. The 
internal case studies will consist of the automobile and semiconductor industries, and the 
external case studies will be of Israel’s and Australia’s space programs. 
As stated before, the ROK’s automobile and semiconductor industries are 
considered as successful cases, through a combination of government policies, R&D 
support, and promotion of human resources. To compare them with the ROK’s space 
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Sources to be used will be information from the Korea Nation Law Information 
Center, Structural Analysis (STAN) Database from OECD, R&D information from the 
Korea Institute of Science and Technology Evaluation and Planning (KISTEP), the 
Ministry of Strategy and Finance, and the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & 
Trade. 
Israel’s and Australia’s space programs are significant to analyze the orientation 
of technology development by comparison with the ROK’s case. First, Israel is a smaller 
country than the ROK in terms of GDP, but it is rated ahead of the ROK in space 
development. John J. Klein characterizes Israel as a medium space power on the level of 
Japan and India in a recent article.63 Also, unlike the ROK, Israel’s space program was 
motivated initially by security concerns about the threats posed by neighboring countries. 
Its space program started in the early 1980s, and focused on military space technologies 
such as reconnaissance, observation, and communication.64 The Space Report 2013 also 
emphasizes that military applications have been the main driver of its space activities.65 
Recently, Israel has increased its civil space funding, published new policies, and tried to 
                                                 
63 John J. Klein, “Space Strategy Considerations for Medium Space Powers,” Astropolitics 10, no. 2 
(2012): 111.  
64 Deganit Paikowsky, et al., “Israel’s Space Strategy,” in Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory 
ad Policy, ed. Eligar Sadah (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 322.  
65 Space Foundation, The Space Report 2013, Space Foundation (2013), 52.  
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invest in the commercial market by producing civilian devices to promote the 
sustainability of its space program, but its “lack of industry scale continues to limit its 
commercial space presence, despite a vibrant startup sector,” according to analysis by the 
Futron Corporation.66  
On the other hand, Australia has a similar level of national power to the ROK in 
terms of GDP. However, Australia is in the only three OECD countries that does not have 
a national space agency. Moreover, Australia has promoted efficient satellite utilization 
policy through using foreign satellite and sharing data with the owners of these satellites, 
especially the United States. But this policy is beginning to change to due to the 
perceived risk of excessive dependence of foreign capabilities. According to Australia’s 
Satellite Utilisation Policy published by Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, 
Research and Tertiary Education of Australia (DIISRTE), Australia has typically 
accessed “international space systems in a fragmented fashion, depending on geographic 
advantages or the goodwill of other nations.”67 The policy emphasizes that Australia has 
recognized its space dependencies recently and has begun to pursue independent 
operation of satellites for the national interests. 
To compare each case, this thesis will use the framework from Danielle Wood 
and Annalisa Weigel’s work. Table 2, generated by Wood and Weigel and published in 
one of the leading journal in space sector, Space Policy, introduces a framework of the 
Space Technology Ladder (STL).68 The authors analyze the strategic policy choices of 
developing space countries from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The study defines 
national space activity as “investment in areas of satellites and launch vehicles,” and uses 
the STL, which consists of four categories: launch capability, a satellite in Geostationary 
                                                 
66 SatMagazine, “Futron’s 2014 Space Competitiveness Index – An Executive Summary,” (June 2014), 
72; “Israel: Israel Uses Military Expertise to Join Commercial Space Race.” Asia News Monitor, March 09, 
2015. 
67 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), Australia’s Satellite Utilisation Policy, Department of Industry, 
Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education of Australia, 3. 
68 Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing 
Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28 (2012), 16–17. 
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Orbit (GEO), a satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), and establishment of a national space 
agency.69 
To collect meaningful data, the authors analyze each country’s milestones and 
when they achieved each level of the ladder for the first time. Furthermore, based on the 
STL achievement by countries, Wood and Weigel discuss their policy decisions, which 
they divide into three categories: space program capabilities, national context, and 
international context. In addition, they summarize the policy decision points: their 
method of acquiring satellites—purchase or manufacture; satellite manufacturing—
building payloads or only the bus; the primary purpose of satellite projects; the timing of 
building local satellite processing facilities; and the decision of investment in local launch 
capability.70 Thus, it is useful to analyze the comparative orientation of the ROK’s space 











                                                 
69 Ibid.  
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Table 2.   The Space Technology Ladder. 
The Space Technology Ladder 
13 Launch Capability : Satellite to GEO 
12 Launch Capability : Satellite to LEO 
11 GEO Satellite : Build Locally 
10 GEO Satellite : Build through Mutual International Collaboration 
9 GEO Satellite : Build Locally with Outside Assistance 
8 GEO Satellite : Procure 
7 LEO Satellite : Build Locally 
6 LEO Satellite : Build through Mutual International Collaboration 
5 LEO Satellite : Build Locally with Outside Assistance 
4 LEO Satellite : Build with Support in Partner’s Facility 
3 LEO Satellite : Procure  
2 Space Agency : Establish Current Agency 
1 Space Agency : Establish First Nation Space Office 
Adapted from Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in 
Developing Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28 (2012), 16–17. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The current chapter will be Chapter I. Chapter II will examine the internal cases, 
divided into two parts: the automobile and semiconductor industries. Chapter III will 
describe the ROK’s space policies, R&D investment, efforts to foster human resources, 
international cooperation, and development path. Chapter IV will scrutinize the external 
cases, also divided into two parts, Israel and Australia. Finally, Chapter V will offer 
analysis of the ROK’s prospects for developing a sustainable space program and make 
some policy recommendations.   
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II. THE INTERNAL CASES 
This chapter will examine the ROK’s automobile and semiconductor industries in 
terms of policies, R&D investment, and human resources of each industry in order to 
compare with and against those of the ROK space industry. To be specific, policies will 
be studied to figure out their objectives and formulas which were set up under the 
governmental acts and official plans in order to achieve growth of automobile and 
semiconductor industries. Next, R&D investment will be examined by budgetary 
expenditure in R&D fields by the government and private sector. Finally, this chapter 
will look into human resources of automobile and semiconductor industries by the growth 
of the number of R&D performing institutions, increasing researchers engaged the 
institutions, and examination of milestones of research institutions’ foundation. 
For its internal cases, the thesis analyzes two manufacturing industries, the 
automobile industry and the semiconductor industry. The industries are representative 
examples of the ROK’s successful economic development through a catch-up strategy 
and adopting latecomer’s incentives, and the OECD Development Centre notes that both 
of these industries benefited from promotion acts, private R&D support, and the 
government-leading development of skilled human resources. 71 Moreover, the two 
industries’ positions have high world ranking. According to the Korea Automobile 
Manufacturers Association (KAMA), the ROK was ranked fifth in an automobile 
industry among the other nation. 72  In particular, the growth of exports by ROK’s 
automobile industry from 1998 to 2014 is remarkable. The amount of exports in terms of 
money has been sextupled during the period; it was $12.8 billion in 1998 and became 
$75.6 billion in 2014.73 Moreover, the ROK produced 4.5 million cars which account for 
5.4% of the world market share, exported 3.2 million cars a year as the third largest 
                                                 
71 Annalisa Primi et al., Industrial Policy and Territorial Development: Lessons From Korea (Paris: 
OECD Pub., 2012), 35.  
72 Korean Automobile Manufacturers Association, “2013 sutjalo bon jadongcha sanub” 2013 숫자로 
본 자동차 산업,” [Examination of The Automobile Industry Through Numbers in 2013], 24. 
73 ROK National Statistical Office, “Jipyo sangsae: Jadongcha saneub” 지표상세: 자동차 산업 
[Detailed Index: Automobile Industry] accessed October 14, 2016. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/
idxMain/selectPoSttsIdxSearch.do?idx_cd=1150&clas_div=&idx_sys_cd=518&idx_clas_cd=1  
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number of exportation in the world, and put five companies, which are Hyundai, Kia, GM 
Korea, Renault-Samsung, and SSangyong Motors, into the list of a hundred-world-
ranking manufacturers in 2013.74On the other hand, Korea Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA) analyzes that ROK semiconductor industry is leading the world 
market in a field of memory manufacture. 75  The growth of exports by ROK’s 
semiconductor industry from 1998 to 2014 is also outstanding. The amount of export in 
terms of money has been increased three and half times during the period; it was $17 
billion in 1998 and became $62.6 billion in 2014.76 In addition, the manufacture of D-
RAM’s share of the world market was 56%, NAND-type flash memory makes up 52.6% 
in 2009, and international competitiveness of the industry, especially, is the world best 
class in fields of process capability and yield per unit process.77 Moreover, Hyeondai and 
Lucky-Gumsung Electronics had lead the industry during the early period, and current 
leading companies in the semiconductor industry are Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix. 
For analyses, this thesis uses information from the governmental institutions, such 
as ROK National Law Information Center and ROK National Archives, and Korea 
Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning. A period of analyses for policies and 
foundation of agency is from the earliest milestone to present; it for R&D investment and 
the number of researchers and institutions is from 1998 to 2014. Although the early 
stage’s information of R&D investment and the number of researchers would be 
significant index due to the fact that they reflect efforts by the government and private 
sector to promote the industry, the information has been impossible to locate the data, , 
because the R&D information for ROK industries, like automobile, semiconductor, and 
                                                 
74 Ibid.  
75 Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency, “Bandochae” 반도체 [Semiconductors], 
http://www.contactkorea.go.kr/jsp/ko/info/info2_1_2.jsp.   
76 ROK National Statistical Office, “Jipyo sangsae: Bandochae saneub” 지표상세: 반도체 산업 
[Detailed Index: Semiconductor Industry] accessed October 14, 2016. http://www.index.go.kr/potal/stts/
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air and space, has not been totalized before 1997.78 But still, analysis of patterns of 
variation in the same period of time among the industries is also sufficient to find 
differences.  
A. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
1. Policy 
Policy is divided into two parts, promotion act and promotion plan. In order to 
promote the automobile industry, ROK established the Automobile Industry Protection 
Act and adopted several Five-year Automobile Industry Plan, such as the first Five-Year 
Automobile Industry Plan, the Five-year Plan for Localization of Automobile Products. 
Moreover, the Automobile Industry Basic Promotion Plan, the Automobile Industry 
Unification Plan, and the Long-term Plan for Promotion of the Automobile Industry were 
adopted in accordance with the Presidential Orders for Promotion of Automobile Industry. 
a. Promotion Act 
The first ROK law related with promotion of the automobile industry was 
legislated and enforced with the title of the Automobile industry Protection Act on May 
31, 1962.79 It only had ten articles consisting of only 12 sentences, but the provisions 
were exceedingly commanding. Its objective was to protect and raise ROK automobile 
industry through ways in which of adjustment of the production cost, import control of 
cars and its components, and a preferential tariff.80 Then Minister of Trade and Industry 
(currently the Minister of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE)) had the authority to 
adjust of the production cost, limit the amount of imported cars and its parts, and lighten 
                                                 
78 Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology (1998); Korea 
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Performance and Type of R-D(1963-1980),” OECD, http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/
data/research-and-development-statistics/r-d-expenditure-by-sector-of-performance-and-type-of-r-d-1963-
1980_2448a8a8-en; The KISTEP report comprises basis information to make OECD data, and ROK has 
been a member of OECD since 1996, accordingly, no report was drawn up before 1997. 
79 Korea National Law Information Center, “Jadongcha gongub bohobeob” 자동차공업보호법 
[Automobile Industry Protection Act], http://www.law.go.kr/lsEfInfoP.do?lsiSeq=627#   
80 Ibid.   
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taxes which assigned to automobile enterprises.81 The Act, however, had been applied 
temporarily because its prescribed duration in force was by the end of 1967.82 
b. Promotion Plan 
(1) The First Five-Year Automobile Industry Plan 
The First Five-Year Automobile Industry Plan, which was a concrete plan of the 
First Five-Year Economic Development Plan created by former President Park Jung-hee, 
was established on April 17, 1962. 83  The contents of the Plan were to support the 
Automobile Industry Protect Act. 
(2) Automobile Industry Unification Plan 
The Automobile Industry Unification Plan was promoted in 1963. It sought to 
reduce expenses of the automobile industry through a guideline of production standards 
which offer monotonous production of vehicles.84 According to the plan, the guideline 
states three standards. First, a passenger car must be produced as a small-size car which 
consumes less fuel, regardless of a purpose of the car whether for private use or business 
use, in order to save foreign currency which is paid for gas.85 Next, a middle- to large- 
size car must be equipped a diesel engine for the saving of fuel, the number of models is 
restricted in order to standardize the industrial manufacturing process.86 Finally, each 
manufacturing plant is allowed to produce specific components in order to protect and 
nurture the automobile industry until it become mature.87 
                                                 
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Korean Presidential Archives, “Jaeilcha kyungjaekaebal ogaenien gaehuik(1962-1966)” 제 1차 
경제개발 5개년 계획(1962-1966) [The First Five-Year Economic Development Plan(1962-1966)], 
http://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/policy/index020202.jsp  
84 ROK National Archives, “Jadongcha sanub yuksung” 자동차산업육성 [Promotion of Automobile 





(3) Five-year Plan for Localization of Automobile Products 
The Five-year Plan for Localization of Automobile Products, also known as the 
Automobile Industry Comprehensive Promotion Plan, was adopted in 1964. 88  ROK 
government designated 75 private enterprises to achieve localization of automobile 
components through interrelationship among each other and carried out economic support 
policy toward the business.89 
(4) Automobile Industry Basic Promotion Plan 
After the Five-year Plan for Localization of Automobile Products had run out in 
1969, the ROK government established the Automobile Industry Basic Promotion Plan to 
fill up the gap of a plan for localization. On December 1969, the Automobile Industry 
Basic Promotion Plan was adopted to promote localization for the automobile industry, 
which is as a link of extended the Five-year Plan for Localization of Automobile Products, 
because its objectives for localization was hindered due to sluggish results.90 
(5) Presidential Orders for Promotion of Automobile Industry and Long-term 
Plan for the Promotion of Automobile Industry 
President Park emphasized the significance of an automobile industry because 
President believed that the automobile industry could lead other industries toward the 
rapid growth, so he made the orders to foster the industry in 1973. His actual plan can be 
summarized by four steps; first, achieve localization of automobile manufactures by 1975; 
second, simplify the types and models of cars; third, separate manufacturing process and 
assembling process while use existing plants to manufacture and assemble parts; and 
fourth, prepare the step for exportation of components through making a manufacturing 
process to meet the world standards.91 In accordance with the orders, then Ministry of 
Commerce (now known as MOTIE) implemented the Long-term Plan for the Promotion 
of Automobile Industry on January 1973 in order to execute the orders by concrete 






plan.92 One of the most significant objectives of the plan was to accomplish localization-
rate as up to 72% by the end of 1973 and 95% by 1975.93 
2. R&D Investment 
a. Total R&D Budget  
The total R&D budgetary expenditure for the automobile industry has been 
increased steadily over a period of analysis. The increasing trend of the amount of the 
R&D budget is obvious with reference to the linear line (see a solid line at Figure 1). 
According to KISTEP, the R&D budget amount for the automobile industry was 1.47 
trillion KRW in 1998. The budget was gradually increased, and the amount of the total 
R&D budget became 5.88 trillion KRW in 2014.94 During the past 17 years, the R&D 
budget is increased by 300%. The rise is notable because GDP of the ROK was increased 
by 204% from 487 trillion KRW to 1,484 trillion KRW during the same period.95 
b. R&D Budget in Private Sector 
The R&D budget in private sector also has been increased constantly. Moreover, 
it shares considerably high percentage of the total expenditure. According to KISTEP, the 
automobile industry’s R&D budget by private sector was 1.43 trillion KRW in 1998, and 
it shared 98% of the total R&D budget at that time.96 At the same time, the private 
sector’s R&D budget has been increased untiringly and maintained its share in the total 
R&D budget (see a dash line at Figure 1). Consequently, the industry’s R&D Budget by 
private sector was 5.7 trillion KRW, and it was 97% of total R&D budget in 2014.97 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Korea Institute for Industrial Economy and Trade, “Chong yungugaebalbee byunhwa” 
총연구개발비변화 [Transition of R&D Budget], http://www.istans.or.kr/su/
TimeSeries1.jsp?scode=262&ucode=77&ccode=2#   
95 Economic Statistics System, “100 Korean Stat.” http://ecos.bok.or.kr/jsp/vis/keystat/
index_e.html#/detail  
96 KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of R&D in S&T.” 
97 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.  R&D Budget of Automobile Industry. 
 
Source: Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology; synthesis of 
information from 1998 to 2014. 
3. Human Resources 
a. R&D Performing Institutions and Researchers 
The number of the R&D performing institutions and researchers in the institutions 
has been raised up increasingly (see a solid line and a dash line at Figure 2). The number 
of institutions which perform R&D for the automobile industry was 130 in 1998.98 
Moreover, the headcount of personnel engaged in R&D is 14,693 persons, and 
researchers were 10,669 persons at that time.99 Among those researchers, 221 persons 
have doctor’s degree, 2,264 persons have master’s degree, and 6,485 persons have 
bachelor’s degree and were graduated from a university.100  
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Figure 2.  Human Resources of Automobile Industry. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014. 
On the other hand, the number of R&D performing institutions for the industry 
was increased to 1,215 in 2014, and the number of personnel engaged in R&D was 
39,341 persons, and researchers were 30,842 persons.101 Among those researchers, 847 
persons have doctor’s degree, 6,626 persons have master’s degree, and 22,233 persons 
have bachelor’s degree among those researchers.102  
The increment of the number of R&D performing institutions has been 
accompanied the increased number of researchers who work at the institutions (see a 
solid line and a dash line at Figure 2). Two line’s gradients look similar to each other; 
however, it does not necessarily mean that increasing number of institutions carries 
augmentation of researchers in terms of quantity. The number of researchers per 
institution was 82 persons in 1998, but the number of researchers per an institution was 
decreased to no small extent, 25 persons per institution. 
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b. Foundation of Research Institution 
There is no institution established by ROK government for the automobile 
industry. Instead, several nonprofit corporations, such as the Korea Automotive 
Technology Institute, which was founded in 1990, and the Korea Automotive Research 
Institute, are being funded by the government to enhance a level of R&D.103 
B. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY 
1. Policy 
The policies to promote the semiconductor industry are divided into an act and 
two plans: the Electronics Industry Promotion Act of 1969, the Eight-year Plan for 
Promotion of Electronics Industry, and the Plan of Fostering the Electronics Company.  
a. Promotion Act 
The Electronics Industry Promotion Act was established on Jan 28, 1969 for the 
first time, revised in 1981, ceased and replaced with the Industry Promotion Act in 1986. 
In 1969, electronics industry was designated as one of the six-basic industries, which 
were selected by the government to develop technologies and promote economy, so main 
purposes of the act were to modernize industrial technologies and to contribute economic 
growth of a nation.104  
The Act stated that the Minister of Trade and Industry (currently MOTIE) 
publicly announces the Plan of Advance Electronics Industry, which is focused on sub-
industries required to develop manufacturing technologies, increase the output of the 
process, and improve efficiency of the process. Next, the Act announced to raise the 
Electronics Industry Promotion Fund to promote the industry, and prescribed a 
government subsidy, like a loan with long-term low interest, to move forward with the 
Plan. 
                                                 
103 Ibid. 
104 Korea National Law Information Center, “Jeonjagongupjinghuengbeob” 전자공업진흥법 
[Electronics Industry Promotion Act], http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=644#0000  
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b. Promotion Plan 
(1) Eight-year Plan for Promotion of Electronics Industry 
The Eight-year Plan for Promotion of Electronics Industry was adopted in 1969 
along with the Electronics Industry Promotion Act. Originally, the plan was designed to 
cover a period of 5 years from 1969 to 1973; however, it had changed its term of matter 
to 8 years in order to match with a cycle of a national-level plan, the Third Five-year Plan 
for Economic Fostering, which was planned to be ended in 1976.105  
The three major objectives of the plan were development of prioritized fostering 
components, achievement of a goal of exports, and localization of manufacturing for 
components.106 According to the plan, several institutions were selected to achieve the 
goal. Among those institutions, the Fine Instruments Center (currently the Korea Testing 
Laboratory), National Industrial Institute (currently the Korean Agency for Technology 
and Standards), and Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) were the main 
spindles to move forward with the plan.107 
(2) Detailed Plan for Fostering Semiconductor Industry 
MOTIE established the Detailed Plan for Fostering Semiconductor Industry in 
1982. The semiconductor industry was able to be supported by the government in 
accordance with this plan. In particular, this plan is unique due to the fact that it was the 
ROK’s first plan which targets specific industry to promote its productivity 
individually.108 The plan pointed out one of the problems facing ROK semiconductor 
industry was that enormous investment is needed in the beginning of the industry, so 
                                                 
105 ROK National Archive, “Jeonja Gongeup Jinghueng Gyehuik” 전자공업진흥계획 [Plan for 
Promotion of Electronics Industry], http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/
listSubjectDescription.do?id=001657  
106 Ibid.  
107 Ibid.  
108 KISTEP, “Kuknae bandochae jangbisanub yuksungul wehan jeongbuui R&D jiwonjeongchek 
banghyang” 국내반도체 장비산업 육성을 위한 정부의 R&D 지원정책 방향 [Direction of R&D 
Support Policy by Government for Promotion of Domestic Semiconductor Industry], KISTEP R&D Focus 
2009–12, no.23 (2009), 15.    
 33 
private sector shirked investment in the industry due to risk bearing.109 Accordingly, the 
plan stated detailed schemes like a fundraising up to 1.4 billion KRW for technical 
development and cutting down an inland tax and tariffs in order to solve the problem and 
activate investment by private sector.110 
2. R&D Investment 
a. Total R&D Budget 
The rise of the total R&D budget for the semiconductor industry is outstanding. 
The total budget expenditure was 0.97 trillion KRW in 1998; it was increased to 16.8 
trillion KRW in 2014.111 The increased rate is 1,631%. Given the fact that the GDP 
growth of the ROK during the same period was 204%, the R&D budget for the 
semiconductor industry was increased more steeply than the one for the automobile 
industry. In fact, the actual gap of the budget between 1998 and 2014 becomes larger 
than the numerical value shown at the figure, because KISTEP analyzed the R&D budget 
with expenditure not only of the semiconductor industry alone but also of the whole 
Electronics industry including the semiconductor industry until 2007. Moreover, a trend 
of the growth has been increased regularly throughout the period. (see a solid line at 
Figure 3). To short, the ROK semiconductor industry’s R&D expenditure in 2014 
surpassed 16 times than the electronics industry’s R&D budget in 1998. 
b. R&D Budget in Private Sector 
The private sector’s R&D budget for the semiconductor industry also has been 
raised remarkably like the one of the automobile industry, and likewise, its share in the 
total R&D budget has been vast. According to KISTEP, the R&D budget by private 
sector was 926 billion KRW in 1998, and it was 95% of total R&D budget at that time.112 
In 2014, 16.7 trillion KRW is semiconductor industry’s budget for R&D by private sector, 
                                                 
109 ROK Presidential Archives, “Bandochae gongub yuksung kehuik” 반도체공업 육성계획 [Plan 
for Fostering Semiconductor Industry], http://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/policy/
index.jsp?scate=PS1_02&tcate=PS1_02_04#wrap  
110 Ibid.  
111 KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of R&D in S&T.” 
112 Ibid. 
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and it shared 99% of total R&D budget. Moreover, increasing trend is nearly identical 
with the trend line of total R&D budget growth (see a dash line at Figure 3). The amount 
of R&D budget by private sector was 16.7 trillion KRW in 2014 which is almost 
analogous to the total R&D budget in that year. 
Figure 3.  R&D Budget of Semiconductor Industry. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014. 
3. Human Resources 
a. R&D Performing Institutions and Researchers 
The number of R&D performing institutions for semiconductor industry in 1998 
was 111. 113 The headcount of researchers in the institutions were 8,755 persons.114 
Among those researchers, 602 persons have doctor’s degree, 2,867 persons have master’s 
degree, and 4,995 persons have bachelor’s degree and were graduated from a 
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university.115 The number of researchers per one institution was 79 persons. The number 
of institutions to researchers is charted in Figure 4. 
Figure 4.  Human Resources in the Semiconductor Industry. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014; KISTEP had put together information about the electronic 
components industry and the semiconductors before 2007, and has examined the semiconductor industry 
only since 2008. Thus, a linear line that shows a trend of variation is pointless in this figure. 
In addition, the number of R&D performing institutions in 2014 was 347, and the 
number of researchers was 54,335 persons.116 Among those researchers, 5,504 persons 
have doctor’s degree, 14,059 persons have master’s degree, and 30,642 persons have 
bachelor’s degree and were graduated from a university.117 The number of researchers 
per one institution was 156 persons. A linear is pointless in this analysis due to a rapid 
decrease between 2007 and 2008, because KISTEP put data about the electronics 
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components companies and the semiconductor companies together before 2007 and split 
them into distinct subjects of analysis from 2008. 
b. Foundation of Research Institution 
The National Industrial Institute (currently the Korean Agency for Technology 
and Standards) and Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KIST) were the major 
institutions to achieve the objectives of several plans for promotion.118 Moreover, the 
Korea Electronics Industry Cooperative, Association of Exportation of Electronics 
Products, and the Fine Instruments Center (currently the Korea Testing Laboratory) were 
founded in the late 1960s; however, no institution was established just for the sake of 
development of semiconductor’s technologies.119 
C. CONCLUSION 
The ROK’s two successful industries, the automobile and the semiconductor, 
have followed typical latecomer’s development steps to develop skills and achieve 
technological catch-up. First, each industry’s policy, which consists of promotion acts 
and plans for promotion, set clear goals and targeted measure to support the industries. 
The major points of the objectives were to protect the industries until they become mature 
and to promote the industries through ways of localization, standardization, enhancement 
of efficiency of manufacturing process. In particular, these efforts for promotion were 
encouraged by presenting exact number of targeted level and date. Moreover, ROK 
government has stimulated investment by private sector through a plan for domestic firm 
supporting like fundraising, import control, encouragement of exports, and preferential 
tariffs. 
Next, the industries have three features in R&D investment. First, R&D budgetary 
expenditure for the industries has been increased steadily throughout a period of analysis. 
                                                 
118 ROK National Archive, “Jeonja Gongeup Jinghueng Gyehuik’ 전자공업진흥계획 [Plan for 
Promotion of Electronics Industry], http://www.archives.go.kr/next/search/
listSubjectDescription.do?id=001657  
119 Suengryong Kim, “Jeonja jinheung bokoseo” 전자진흥 보고서 [A Report for Promotion of 
Electronics], Digital Times, October 10, 2010. http://www.dt.co.kr/
contents.html?article_no=2010111102010532614001 
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Both of the industries have increased R&D budgets more than increases of GDP, and the 
growth rates are also regular. In addition, shares of private sector’s investment in R&D 
budgetary have been steady and heavy. Showing at the figures, linear trend lines express 
that the growth of the total budget has increased along with private sector’s R&D budget. 
Moreover, rate of shares has been over 90% for the most of the period and some case 
shows even 99%. 
Finally, human resources of each industry also have been increased persistently in 
terms of the number of R&D performing institutions and researchers who engage R&D. 
Even though headcount of researchers per an institution was decreased, total number of 
researchers was considerably increased due to increment of the number of institutions 
performing R&D.  
Yet, unlike analysis by the Development Centre Studies of the OECD, 
establishment of a government-led institution is not featured in the ROK’s automobile 
industry and the semiconductor industries. Some R&D activity has been performed 
through some institutions; however, those institutions were not founded for the sake of 
developing specific industries’ technologies and skills.  
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III. ROK SPACE PROGRAM 
This chapter will examine the path of development followed by the ROK space 
industry by looking into its policies, R&D investment, and human resources. Prior to 
analyzing these factors, the chapter summarizes the historical development of the ROK 
space program in order to create a ROK Space Technology Ladder (STL). The ROK’s 
STL will be then compared with the external cases in Chapter IV. Although Wood and 
Weigel analyzed the ROK STL along with the other countries in their article, “Charting 
the Evolution of Satellite Programs in Developing Countries–The Space Technology 
Ladder,” this chapter will elaborate some points of Wood’s and Weigel’s study and focus 
on the ROK case only. Moreover, ROK investment in military space capability, which 
was not dealt with in the article by Wood and Weigel, will be examined for the sake of 
drawing implications for the ROK’s space program. 
Next, to compare with the internal cases, the automobile and semiconductor 
industries, the chapter will employ the same methods by which the internal cases of the 
automobile and semiconductor industries were examined. First, policies which were 
adopted for the space industry will be discussed in terms of the objectives and structures 
that were set up under the governmental acts and official plans in order to achieve growth 
of the air and space industry. Next, R&D investment will be studied by budgetary 
expenditures in R&D fields by the government and private sector. Finally, human 
resources will be analyzed through examination of milestones related to the foundation of 
research institutions and changes in the number of R&D performing institutions and 
researchers engaged in these institutions. 
Finally, the current status of the ROK’s space industry will be deduced by 
contrast and comparison with that of the automobile industry and the semiconductor 
industry. Questions pursued include whether the space industry has enjoyed the same 
features and follows the same trajectory, and what factors create differences. 
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A. HISTORICAL SPACE ACTIVITIES 
1. Space Agency 
Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) takes full charge for national space 
research of the ROK. Guangrae Cho, the president of KARI, explains the purpose of 
KARI is “contributing to solid development of the national economy and enhancement of 
national life through a new exploration and technological advancements, development, 
and dissemination in the field of aerospace science and technology.”120 Moreover, he 
clarifies that KARI was founded in 1989. 121  Even though KARI established as an 
independent institution in 1996, it recognizes an Aerospace Center, which was founded in 
1989, as a predecessor. The Aerospace Center was established on October 10, 1989, as an 
affiliate of the Korea Institute of Machinery and Materials (KIMM). The ROK 
government had had an interest in advanced technology industries, such as 
nanotechnology and biotechnology, since the 1980s, and aerospace technology was also 
one of the industries which the ROK had watched with keen interest.122 ROK’s genuine 
efforts toward fostering an aerospace industry were codified in legislation called the 
Aerospace Industry Act of 1987, and the Aerospace Center under the KIMM was 
established as the first and the only one aerospace-specialized research institute at 
Daedeok Research Complex in Daejeon city. 123  Furthermore, the Aerospace Center 
became a member of International Aeronautical Federation in 1992. 
On November 22, 1996, KARI became independent from KIMM and established 
as an incorporated foundation, which is owned by the government. KARI’s research 
activities are divided into aeronautics including fixed-wing aircraft and rotorcraft, 
satellites, space launch vehicles, utilization of satellite images, and satellite navigation.124 
Accordingly, the organization consists of an Aeronautics R&D Office, a Satellite R&D 
                                                 
120 “Greeting Address,” KARI. http://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub01_01.do.   
121 Ibid. 
122 ROK National Archives, “Hankook hanggong wooju yeonguso” 한국항공우주연구소 [Korea 
Aerospace Research Institute] 
123 Ibid. 
124 KARI, “R&D.” http://www.kari.re.kr/eng/sub03_01.do.  
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Office, the NARO Space Center in charge of space launch vehicles, a Convergence 
Technology Research Office, and a Satellite Information Center.  
2. Satellite 
The ROK’s satellite programs are divided into four categories: the Science and 
Technology Satellite (STSAT), the KOREASAT, the Korea Multi-purpose Satellite 
(KOMPSAT), and the GEO KOMPSAT. In each category, the first satellites produced, 
some of the second satellites, and all KOREASATs, were developed in cooperation with 
foreign institutes or enterprises, while the others were developed independently. 
Furthermore, the development of satellites assumes an aspect of increased commercial 
participation in the satellite program recently. 
a. KITSAT and Science and Technology Satellite (STSAT) 
The satellite development in the ROK was initiated by KAIST. 125  KAIST 
manufactured KITSAT-1 (ROK name Uribyul-1) in collaboration program with the 
University of Surrey, UK.126 KITSAT-1 was launched on 11 August 1992, by the Ariane 
rocket from Kourou, French Guiana.127 After that, KITSAT-2 (Uribyul-2) and -3 were 
developed independently by the SatReC Initiative.128 The ROK launched KITSAT-2 in 
1993 and KITSAT-3 in 1999.  
The STSAT is for scientific experimentation, education of students, and testing 
next generation technology. In October 1998, the STSAT development was started based 
on technology acquired through the KITSAT series. 129  Its development took place 
through cooperation among KARI, the University of California at Berkeley, and the 
                                                 
125 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 141; “About SI,” Satrec Initiative. https://www.satreci.com/
aboutsi/?anchor=a01&/; on this, Hwang states in his article that KITSAT-1 development was initiated by the 
Satrec Initiative; however, the Satrec Initiative was founded by former KAIST engineers as a private 
manufacturer in 1999. It seems he mentioned the Satrec Initiative as a sub-organization that was already 
founded under KAIST since the satellite program was started; Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea,” 196.  
126 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 141–2. 
127 KARI, “Planning of Mid- and Long-term National Space Development Plan,” 27. 
128 Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea,” 197; Hwang also considers the Satrec Initiative the same 
entity as KAIST here. 
129 KARI, “Planning of Mid- and Long-term National Space Development Plan,” 29. 
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University of South Australia.130 STSAT-1 was launched in Russia by Cosmos-3M rocket 
in 2003. 131  STSAT-2 development started by SatRec Initiative in 2002, and it was 
launched successfully by the KSLV-I, the first Korean space launch vehicle, in 2013.132 
Yet it was the third attempt to launch STSAT-2 by the KSLV-I. The first attempt was in 
2009, and the second one was in 2010, but both of those efforts failed to put the satellite 
into orbit. 133  The original mission of STSAT-2 was monitoring the Earth and its 
atmosphere with its dual-channel radiometers.134 
STSAT-3 was developed by KARI and SatRec Initiativefor observation of space 
and the Earth with its primary payload: a near-infrared camera and a secondary payload, 
a micro image-spectrometer.135 
b. KOREASAT (Mugunghwa) 
KOREASAT, also known as Mugunghwa is the ROK’s communications satellites. 
Mugunghwa is a name of flower that is a national symbol of the ROK. Since 
KOREASAT-1 was launched in August 5, 1995, five KOREASATs, -1, -2, -3, -5, and -6, 
have been boosted in GEO. In addition, KOREASAT-5A is being planned to take a back-
up role for KOREASAT-5.All of the satellites were produced by foreign companies, such 
as U.S. Lockheed Martin, French Alcatel-Lucent or Thales Alenia Space, launched by 
U.S. Delta II rocket from Cape Canaveral Air Force Base, the U.S., Ariane launcher from 
Guiana Space Center, or Russian Zenit rocket. The satellites are operated by KT 
Corporation only for a purpose of public communications except KOREASAT-5 which 





134 Hwang, “Space Activities in Korea,” 197. 
135 KARI, “Planning of Mid- and Long-term National Space Development Plan,” 30. 
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equipped Ka-band for military communications. 136  KOREASAT-5 was launched in 
August 22, 2006. 
c. Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT) 
The Korea Multi-Purpose Satellite (KOMPSAT) orbits in LEO and observes the 
Earth, oceans, and scientific phenomena. The Arirang-1’s development began in 1994, 
and KARI announced that Arirang-1 was jointly developed with a U.S. company, TRW, 
as the ROK had no experience in developing multi-purpose satellites at that time.137  
Arirang-1 was launched in 1999. The experience of developing of Arirang-1 was a 
stepping stone for the ROK to develop satellites of the future. Based on this experience, 
Arirang-2 was produced by “a rate of self-sufficiency of 91.5% in satellite design and 
65.2% in the fabrication of the satellite parts,” which was completed in cooperation with 
a German Astrium and an Israeli Elbit.138  
Since then, the ROK has been able to develop satellites almost independently, 
except for some parts. Arirang-3, capable of 70-cm-resolution optical observations, 
Arirang-5, equipped all-weather Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), and Arirang-3A, 
capable of 55-cm-resolution optical and IR observations were developed and launched 
successfully.139 Especially, Arirang-3A was produced by the Korea Aerospace Industry 
(KAI) and Korean Air, so it contributed to localization of satellite manufacturing.140 
Arirang-6 will be equipped with SAR for all-weather earth observations and is scheduled 
for launch in 2019.141 
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d. GEO KOMPSAT 
The ROK has also developed Geostationary Orbit Satellite, the GEO KOMPSAT-
1, also known as Cheollian-1, for the purpose of carrying out communications, ocean 
monitoring, and weather observation.142 This multifunctional satellite is the world’s first 
ocean observing GEO satellite in real time, and the ROK became the seventh country to 
have its own weather satellite; it was developed by domestic institutes in cooperation 
with EADS Astrium and launched successfully by an Ariane 5 rocket in 2010.143 
In addition to Cheollian-1, two more GEO KOMPSATs are being developed. The 
GEO KOMPSAT-2A is for weather observations and is going to replace the role of the 
GEO KOMPSAT-1, and GEO KOMPSAT-2B’s purpose is ocean and environmental 
observations. 144  These satellites are scheduled for launch in 2018 and 2019, 
respectively.145 
3. Space Launch Vehicle 
The ROK’s rocket development program was started first as a research program 
for a weapons system rather than for space capability. The first modern rockets were 
developed by National Institute for Defense Science Technology in 1958.146 The institute 
was, however, dissolved in 1961, so the ROK’s rocket program was interrupted. 147 
Moreover, the ROK attempted to possess its own surface to surface missiles in the late 
1970s. The ROK tried to switch a purpose of Nike-Hercules air-defense missiles, which 
were provided by the United States to surface to surface missiles; however, this attempt 
made the United States to be concerned about security destabilization in the Korean 
peninsula.148 Accordingly, missile development of the ROK has been restricted within 
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the range of 180km.149 Afterwards, some universities tried to continue to develop rockets, 
but only KARI began full-scale launcher development in the late 1980s. 150  KARI’s 
rocket programs are divided into three categories: the Korea Sounding Rocket, the First 
Korean Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-I), which is also known as Naroho, and Korea 
Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-II). 
a. Korea Sounding Rocket (KSR) 
KARI has developed three KSRs since 1990. The KSR-I was launched in 1993 
with a solid fuel engine and a payload of less than 200 kg. 151  After five years of 
development from 1993, two KSR-IIs were launched consecutively in 1997 and 1998. It 
also had a solid fuel engine and its payload was 150 kg.152 The KSR-III was the first 
liquid propellant rocket, developed from 1997 to 2002.153 Solid fuel engines for the 
KSR-I and KSR-II had advantages of short launching preparation time and preservation 
of fuel, but the ROK promoted liquid propellant rocket development due to such 
regulations as the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) spell out, which banned 
development of solid fuel engines. 154  The KSR-III was launched in 2002, and its 
technology contributed to the KSLV-I. 
b. First Korean Space Launch Vehicle, Naroho (KSLV-I) 
The KSLV-I was developed through international cooperation; Russia was 
selected as a partner because of a lack of other international willingness to cooperate with 
the ROK’s in space launch vehicle program. KARI said that “Russia was the only 
advanced country in the field of space launch vehicles that was willing to cooperate, and 
had the intention to commercialize Korea’s launch vehicle technology.”155 According to 
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the contract with Russia, the first stage of KSLV-I, which had a liquid propellant rocket, 
was developed by Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center, and the 
second stage, which had a solid fuel rocket, was carried out by KARI.156 Launching of 
the KSLV-I succeeded on its third attempt in 2013. 
c. Korea Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-II) 
The KSLV-II’s development program consists of three phases that will take 10 
years; the program aims to launch the KSLV-II, which will be built locally, twice in 
2020.157 Its goal is to put a 1500 kg satellite into LEO at 600–800 km, and the program 
will use a three-stage liquid propellant rocket (four clustered liquid rocket engines, a 75-
ton liquid rocket engine, and a 7-ton liquid rocket engine).158 
d. Naro Space Center 
The Naro Space Center is the first and the only satellite launch site in the ROK. 
According to the KARI, its construction was started in 2000 in accordance with the Mid- 
to Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development of 1996.159 
The Center consists of “a launch complex, a satellite integration and test center, a 
launch vehicle assembly building, a solid rocket motor building, a launch control 
building, an optical equipment building, and the Space Education/PR Center,” and a 
propulsion test facility was constructed in the Center for a purpose of development of 
KSLV-II in 2013.160 
4. Military Capability 
Despite continued threats by its main enemy, North Korea, since the Korean War, 
the ROK has had little space capability. One of the most influential factors for the present 
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status is the ROK’s dependence on the U.S. defense alliance. The ROK military has used 
communicational, meteorological, and geographical information provided by the U.S. 
military, and the worth of the information is hard to measure in money. Launching 
KOMPSAT-3 in 2012 was useful to some extent in getting rid of a gap in ROK 
intelligence capabilities; however, North Korea’s threats through its missiles and nuclear 
weapons are still above the ROK’s ability to respond to and defend against, so the ROK 
still relies on U.S. intelligence assets.161 
On the other hand, the ROK’s efforts to develop independent intelligence 
capability through infrastructure and assets are ongoing. The ROKAF opened a Space 
Intelligence Center in order to receive real-time information of satellite maneuvers from 
the U.S. and share it with domestic institutes.162 In addition, this is the first national-level 
center based on an MOU signed between the Ministry of National Defense and the 
Pentagon on September 2014.163 On the other hand, the introduction of space assets is in 
progress under the name of the 425 Project. The 425 Project is a plan to launch one SAR-
equipped satellite into GEO and four EO/IR surveillance satellites which have 0.3 to 0.5 
m resolution capability into LEO with a 1 trillion KRW budget by 2022. These satellites 
will be developed independently and manufactured locally. The SAR satellite will be 
developed by the Agency for Defense Development (ADD), the EO/IR satellites are 
under KARI’s responsibility, and KAI and SatReC Initiative are expected to serve as 
production companies, while the ROK will purchase a foreign launch service for these 
satellites.164 Furthermore, ROK military seeks to have autonomous intelligence assets 
based on space capability, which allow the ROK to keep surveillance and reconnaissance 
of Korean peninsula 24/7. The ROK military claims that space assets are essential to 
minimize Kill-Chain cycle for detection and preemptive strikes and build the Korean Air 
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and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation 
(KMPR) against nuclear and missile threats by North Korea.165  
B. BACKGROUND ON THE ROK SPACE INDUSTRY 
1. Policy 
The ROK’s space policies have consisted of two acts and five plans: the 
Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act of 1987; the Space Development 
Promotion Act of 2005; the Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development of 
1996; the Space Development Promotion Act of 2005; the First Basic Plan to Promote 
Space Development of 2007; the Second Basic Plan to Promote Space Development of 
2011; and the Mid- to Long-Term Space Development Plan of 2013. 
a. Promotion Acts 
Over time, the ROK’s priorities for promotion of an aerospace industry have 
shifted their focus from the airplane industry to the space industry. The Aerospace 
Industry Development Promotion Act of 1987 aimed to contribute to national economic 
development by promoting the aerospace industry and aerospace science and 
technology.166  But, the ROK could not afford space science and industry at that time. 
Although the Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development was established in 
1996, there was no laws related space development only. The Space Development 
Promotion Act of 2005, however, was established “to facilitate the peaceful use and 
scientific exploration of outer space and to contribute to national security, the sound 
growth of the national economy, and the betterment of life of citizens through the 
systematic promotion of the development of outer space and the efficient use and 
management of space objects.”167 
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(1) Aerospace Industry Development Promotion Act 
The ROK’s first act legislated in the air and space field was the Aerospace 
Industry Development Promotion Act (hereafter referred to as Aerospace Industry Act) in 
December 1987, although it focuses on the aircraft industry only.168 The purpose of this 
Act was “to contribute to the sound development of the national economy and the 
improvement of people’s lives by supporting and promoting rationally the aerospace 
industry, and researching and developing efficiently aerospace science and 
technology.”169 Given the purpose of this act, the ROK aimed to develop science, and 
technology for the aerospace industry, including “producing aircraft, spacecraft, related 
accessory apparatus, or related materials.”170 
The starting point of this act was necessarily the government. Yet the government 
is not necessarily the only customer of the aerospace industry. Article 3 of this act, 
establishment of a plan for an aerospace industry development fund, includes the 
following requirements: demand by year and category for aircraft, spacecraft, other 
vehicles, and materials to be purchased by the Government; specialization and 
systematization of the aerospace industry; establishment of a comprehensive research 
system and budget for research and the development in aerospace science and 
technology; and a plan for participation in international joint development projects and 
technology introduction.171  
In 2007, the article was amended with clauses on matters concerning  
goals and direction for the development of the aerospace industry; 
implementation structures and strategies for the development of the 
aerospace industry; plans for the development of the aerospace industry; a 
comprehensive research system for research and development of 
aerospace science and technologies and research and development 
budgets; fund raising necessary for the development of the aerospace 
industry and investment plans; fostering of professional human resources 
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necessary for the development of the aerospace industry; international 
cooperation to revitalize the development of the aerospace industry; and 
creation of a specialized complex for the aerospace industry.172  
The article reflected solely the demand of government-centered industry at the 
initial time of the legislation; however, it latter shifted to and reflected to a greater degree 
of civil- and commercial-centered demand. 
According to Article 3, the ROK government was to establish a basic plan for the 
aerospace industry development. The basic plan for the aerospace industry, however, was 
almost solely focused on the aircraft industry, as opposed to the space industry. The 
Aerospace Industry Development Policy Council was established under the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) “to deliberate on matters 
concerning the establishment of the basic plan and the coordination of accompanying 
important policies of the Government and main affairs among Ministries,”173 according 
to Article 14 of the act. The first council was held in 3 July 1997 to establish the basic 
plan. The main agenda items were a mid-size aircraft development plan laid by the 
MOTIE and the Korean Advanced Training Jet development plan laid out by the Ministry 
of National Defense.174  
(2) Space Development Promotion Act 
The Space Development Promotion Act (hereafter referred to as the Space 
Development Act) legislated in 2005 was a basic plan for space, more so than the 
Aerospace Industry Act. The purpose of this act was “to facilitate the peaceful use and 
scientific exploration of outer space and to contribute to national security, the sound 
growth of the national economy, and the betterment of citizen’s lives by systematically 
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promoting the development of outer space and by efficiently using and managing space 
objects.”175 It contained the following articles:  
a. Formulation of a Basic Plan for the Promotion of Space Development 
b. Designation of an Institution Specializing in Space Development 
c. Domestic Registration of Space Objects 
d. International Registration of Space Objects 
e. Liability for Damages Caused by Space Accidents 
f. Formulation of a Basic Plan for Preparing against Dangers in Space 
g. Designation of a Space Environment Surveillance Agency 
h. Composition of a Space Accident Investigation Committee 
i. Dissemination and Use of Satellite Information 
b. Promotion Plans 
The objective of the ROK’s space plan have evolved from generalized to specific, 
maintaining their purpose to acquire independent technological capabilities for space 
development. One of the goals has been “to join the top 10 countries in the space industry 
by competing in the global market.” 176  Subsequently, its goals have concerned the 
expansion of infrastructure, financing and investment plans, research and development, 
international cooperation, management of space objects, extension of civil participation, 
and high-quality human resources.177 
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(1) Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan for Space Development 
The first genuine national space development plan was the Mid- to Long-Term 
Basic Plan for Space Development of 1996. The Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan for 
Space Development was deliberated by the National Science & Technology Commission, 
which was founded under the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST, the current 
Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning). The plan incorporated a space 
development plan for 1996 to 2015, including the development of 19 satellites, a 
scientific rocket, and a space launch vehicle by 2015.178 This Basic Plan was amended 
three times in 1998, 2000, and 2005. In the 2005 version, the plan divided the period into 
the Mid-Term (2006-2010) and the Long-Term (2011-2015).  
The Long-Term plan’s goals were “to acquire the independent technological 
capabilities for space development and to join the top 10 countries in the space industry 
by competing in the global market.”179 In addition to the Long-Term plan, the Mid-Term 
plan’s goals were more specific: acquiring micro-satellite launch capability by 2007 and 
independent development of a LEO multipurpose satellite.180  
(2) First Basic Plan to Promote Space Development 
According to Article 5 of the Space Development Act, the ROK government is 
supposed to write a basic plan for space development promotion every five years, and the 
basic plan should include matters concerning:  
… objectives and direction-setting for space development policies; … 
systems and strategies to pursue space development; …plans to pursue 
space development; … expansion of infrastructure necessary for space 
development; … financing and investment plans for space development; 
… research and development for space development; … nurturing of 
professionals necessary for space development; … international 
cooperation for the invigoration of space development; … promotion of 
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space development projects; … use and management of space objects; 
[and] … utilization of the results of space development.181  
The basic plan is to be deliberated by the National Space Committee, according to 
Article 6 of the Space Development Act. The National Space Committee appoints the 
Minister of MISP as a chairman, and vice-Minister of Strategy and Finance, Foreign 
Affairs, and MOTIE as essential members of the committee according to the Article 6.182 
In 2007, the First Basic Plan to Promote Space Development (hereafter referred to 
as the First Basic Plan) was established. The priorities of the First Basic Plan were 
establishment of independent space technological capability, presentation of a future 
vision, fostering infrastructure, and establishment of institutions.183  
(3) Second Basic Plan to Promote Space Development 
The priorities of the Second Basic Plan in 2011 were early possession of 
independent space technology, setting up of infrastructure for using satellite information, 
extension of civil participation, training of high-quality human resources, and 
establishment of international cooperation.184  
(4) Mid- to Long-Term Space Development Plan 
In 2013, the Mid- to Long-Term Space Development Plan was adopted as a 
revision of the Second Basic Plan to Promote Space Development. The plan defined the 
ROK’s vision as the “enhancement of the Nation’s reputation and distribution to national 
economy development by strengthening independent space development capability.”185 
The plan aimed to achieve this vision through five objectives: increasing the proportion 
of the space budget in the Government R&D budget; establishing an independent launch 
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capability by development of the KSLV-II; sustaining development of satellites by 
extended civilian participation; and establishing space competitiveness.186  
2. R&D Investment 
a. Total R&D Budget 
A linear line, which shows the trend for total expenditures, indicates that－despite 
the plan－budgets have been decreasing (see a solid line at Figure 5). However, the more 
important feature of the total R&D budget for the ROK air and space industry is its 
inconsistency, and the variations of the budget are fundamentally distinct from those of 
the automobile and semiconductor industries in terms of the amount and the rate of 
increase.  
Figure 5.  R&D Budget of Air and Space Industry. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014; KISTEP had examined about the aerospace industry before 
2007, and has researched on the aircraft, spacecraft, and its parts industry since 2008. 
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The ROK air and space industry’s total R&D budget was 20.6 billion KRW in 
1998. Moreover, the amount of expenditure was not only for the aerospace industry but 
also the air industry, including an aircraft industry, so the actual budget for the space 
industry was much less than 20.6 billion KRW. To make matters worse, R&D investment 
shrank to 182 million KRW in 1999. Luckily, it recovered and exceeded 302 billion 
KRW in 2000 and 470 billion KRW in 2001; however, fluctuations of R&D investment 
have been repeated throughout the period of analysis. 
b. R&D Budget in the Private Sector 
R&D budgetary expenditures by the private sector also have fluctuated repeatedly, 
and the amounts and share in total R&D budget was dismally low. 128 billion KRW in 
2001 is the largest investment by the private sector; this was only 27% of total R&D 
budget. On the other hand, the private sector bore 100% of the total R&D budget in 1999; 
it was only 182 million KRW. Overall, the average share rate of the private sector in 
ROK air and space industry during the past 17 years was 51%. 
Although the trend line shows that R&D budget in private sector maintained its 
level during the period, it lacks consistency due to fluctuations from 182 million to 128 
billion KRW (see a dashed line at Figure 5). 
3. Human Resources 
a. R&D Performing Institutions and Researchers 
The number of researchers who were engaged in R&D for the air and space 
industry has been increasing except for the unique value in 1999 (see Figure 6). 
Moreover, the number of institutions that perform aerospace R&D has been regularly 
increasing more than the rate of increase of researchers.  
Only three institutions were counted among aerospace R&D institutions in 1998, 
but there were 57 institutions by 2014. The headcount for researchers also grew from 239 
in 1998 to 1,294 in 2014. But still, the actual number is arguably estimated to be less than 
that because of the fact that the number of institutions and researchers is includes 
statistical data for the aircraft industry and its subsidiaries. 
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b. Foundation of Research Institution 
On October 10, 1989, the Aerospace Center was founded as an affiliate to KIMM, 
and KARI was established independently on November 22, 1996, as discussed earlier. 
Figure 6.  Human Resources of Air and Space Industry. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014; KISTEP had examined about the aerospace industry before 
2007, and has researched on the aircraft, spacecraft, and its parts industry since 2008. 
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different. The space industry shows features at variance with the other industries across in 
the fields of policy, R&D investment, and human resources. 
1. The Problem of Policy Vagueness 
First of all, the policies for the space industry are less explicit than these of the 
other industries in terms of setting goals and targets. A typical example for this assertion 
is that one of the goals stated in the Mid- to Long-Term Basic Plan for Space 
Development was “to join the top 10 countries in the space industry by competing in the 
global market.”187 It is hard to confirm whether the ROK has joined the top 10 countries’ 
club in the space industry or not, and entering the club is not important to the country’s 
space development. That is because rankings can be measured differently from case to 
case, and a nation’s space capability should not be gauged by relative evaluation. 
Moreover, considering the fact that succeeding plans tend to follow in the former’s 
footstep, the setting up of goals in the first plan failed to provide proper guidelines for the 
following plans in comparison with the plans for the automobile and semiconductor 
industries.  
In addition, the policies are insufficient to encourage the private sector to 
participate in business and R&D investment. Even though the acts and plans repeatedly 
call for the expansion of commercial participation, a specific plan or formula for its 
implementation or promotion is almost nonexistent. On the other hand, the Automobile 
industry Protection Act of 1962 stated several formulas, such as adjustment of production 
costs, import control of cars and components, and a preferential tariff for automobile 
enterprises. 188  The ROK government also had offered similar subsidies for the 
semiconductor-manufacturing enterprises to promote development of that industry. In 
particular, the government provided capital for firms in the semiconductor industry in 
order to reduce possible risks in investment, while plans ordered commercial firms to 
follow guidelines for production standards in order to achieve localization, 
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standardization, and improved efficiency in the manufacturing process. In consequence, 
the government succeeded in encouraging private sector participation in the industry in 
spite of investor reluctance. 
An additional difference is that the ROK’s aerospace promotion act did not target 
the space industry specifically. For instance, the only act for promotion of the space 
industry, the Aerospace Industry Act of 1987, failed to differentiate between the aircraft 
industry and the space industry. Although the two industries have similarities to each 
other in terms of technology and skills compared with other industries, they also have 
significant differences that present a problem of focus for the industry. This means that 
the center of the industry tends to lean toward the aircraft industry rather than a space 
industry in the ROK due to the former industry’s maturity and market sizes. While the 
ROK space industry is at the stage of toddling, the aircraft industry has developed and 
accumulated its technologies through several national scale military projects, such as 
Korean Trainer Experimental, Korean Attack Helicopter, and Korean Fighter Program, 
starting with ROK manufacturing of licensed 500MD helicopters since 1976.189 Also, the 
ROK government established a Detailed Plan for Fostering the Semiconductor Industry, 
which targeted the semiconductor industry specifically within the electronics industry.190 
Unlike the plans for these industries, there has been no such detailed plan for space 
industry. 
2. Slump in R&D Investment by the Private Sector 
The most significant difference between the space industry and the others is feeble R&D 
investment by the private sector. As noticed in Chapter II, most of the R&D investment 
for the automobile industry and the semiconductor industry came from the private sector; 
its share was over 95% during the period. Thus, the gap in the total R&D budget between 
the space industry and the others originates in the lack of R&D investment by the private 
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sector. A minimum gap of R&D budget by the private sector between the space industry 
and the semiconductor industry was 911 billion KRW in 1998, and the gap differed a 
great deal over the past 17 years. Consequently, the maximum gap between the two 
industries reached a massive 16,692 billion KRW in 2014. Moreover, the gap with the 
automobile industry is not small (see Figure 7). Besides, the gap in the private sector’s 
share of the R&D budget is conspicuous when one compares the combined government 
and public sector investment figures (see Figure 8). So, it is reasonable to conclude that 
the overall size of R&D investment by the government and public sector does not matter 
as much as what the relative share of the private is within these numbers. Put simply, 
private investment is more successful to sustainability then government investment. 
Figure 7.  R&D Budgets by Private Sector. 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 

























































Automobile Semicunductor Air and Space
 60 
Figure 8.  R&D Budget by Government and Public Sector  
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014. 
Moreover, unpredictable changes of R&D investment in the space industry by the 
government and public sector have weakened private investment (see Figure 8). Private 
enterprises invest in a certain business when they predict stable profitability; however, 
capricious R&D investment in national projects worries the private sector. In particular, 
the fact is that chaebols, such as Samsung, LG, SK, and Hyundai, which are 
conglomerates and major businesses in the ROK, have invested in the automobile and 
semiconductor industry for two possible reasons: the policies were favorable to these 
chaebols so that they invested in the automobile and semiconductor industries willingly, 
or the chaebols invested in the automobile and semiconductor industries because they 
found favorable market in these industries. In any case, private sector made clear-cut 
investment in R&D unlike the space industry. 
3. Inadequate Human Resources 
In contrast to the data of the automobile industry and the semiconductor industry, 
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and a growth rate as well. A curve for growth of the number of R&D institutions and 
researchers in the space industry is much lower-pitched at a glance than those of the 
automobile industry or the semiconductor industry (see Figure 9 and Figure 10). While 
the number of R&D institutions in the automobile industry was 1,215 in 2014, it was only 
57 in the space industry. Moreover, the growth rate of analytic variables is also 
inconspicuous compared to striking growth rate of the others. The headcount of 
researchers in the semiconductor industry increased by eight times and nearly fifty 
thousand personnel, while the number of researchers in the space industry increased by 
only five times to just 1,055 people. 
Figure 9.  Comparison of Institutions by Industry 
 
Source: KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 



















































Figure 10.  Comparison of Researchers by Industry 
 
Adapted from KISTEP, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science and Technology”; 
synthesis of information from 1998 to 2014; the data shown at this figure for the semiconductor industry 
before 2007 are adjusted to balance the rate of increment between data before 2007 and after 2008. The 
numerical values on the figure are one third of the actual number of institutions examined by KISTEP. 
D. CONCLUSION 
An ROK space program, for satellites in particular, has developed significantly in 
a short time. In 1989, KARI was founded as the first milestone of the STL; after four 
years, the ROK launched a LEO satellite om a foreign rocket built locally without foreign 
assistance; after seventeen years afterward, it built a GEO satellite locally with help from 
outside; and it has plans to launch a GEO satellite that will be produced domestically in 
2019 (see Figure 11). 
To achieve these results, the ROK space program has followed regular steps in 
manufacturing satellites. First of all, the ROK utilized international cooperation for the 
procurement of satellites. This foreign assistance was essential to develop satellites in a 
short period of time due to the fact that the ROK’s capability in the space field was 
virtually nonexistence. Based on the technologies that were gained from the process, the 
ROK has sought to build satellites locally, even though some payloads and buses of the 
satellites still required foreign assistance. Finally, it succeeded in building a LEO satellite 





















































The ROK also shows similar steps in the field of launch capability. Despite the 
early efforts to make its own rockets through the KSR, the ROK had to be assisted by 
foreign technology for launch vehicles due to the regulations of MTCR. With 
foundational technologies for the KSLV-I acquired from Russia, the KSLV-II program, 
which will be built locally, is in progress even though the launch vehicle still depends on 
some foreign aid. 
On the other hand, the ROK is attempting to develop an independent space 
military capability in surveillance satellites in LEO and GEO, while it currently relies on 
U.S. space assets. But still, the ROK will continue to support and to maintain cooperation 
with its allies and partners in terms of space information sharing.  
Figure 11.  ROK Space Programs’ Milestone Timeline 
 
Adapted from Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in 
Developing Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28 (2012), 16–17. 
This growth, however, does not offer an optimistic view for sustainable space 
programs for ROK in the long term when compared with features of such successful 






























investment especially by the private sector, and inadequate human resources are the main 
reasons for anxiety regarding the sustainability of the ROK’s space program. Moreover, 
the future of the ROK’s independent military space capability is puzzling. The ROK, 
which does not have an ability to produce an autonomous GEO satellite yet, is planning 
to launch independent military-purpose GEO satellites by its own agencies and 
enterprises. Accordingly, several obstacles are inevitable. Despite an initial requested 
budget for the surveillance satellites of 64 billion KRW, the National Assembly approved 
only 2 billion KRW for FY 2016.191 Moreover, the first launch of one of the satellites, 
which was planned in 2020 initially, has been postponed.192  
These concerns show that the research structure and investment profile of the 
ROK’s space programs are important. A nation’s needs and aspiration for space should 
be solid if it seeks to set policy objectives, capital investment, and development of human 
resources clearly in order to prevent wasting resources and efforts.  
The ROK could accomplish its objectives through one-time performance if its 
main aspiration is “national prestige,” as asserted by H. J. An.193 In fact, the ROK’s first 
astronaut program could be one of the evidences that the ROK’s priority in the space is 
national prestige. The program, which had been invested $25.4 million by the 
government, was terminated due to resignation of the first and only astronaut in 2014, 
and the ROK plans no more astronaut program at present.194  
Such an aspiration is, however, unlikely to foster the private sector’s investment 
in the space industry. Consequently, the phenomenon, which has appeared in R&D 
investment and the human resources, has been foreseen due to lack of the interest in a 
space field by private business. Furthermore, military-purpose satellites, which will play 
                                                 
191 “Daebuk jeongchal wuisung yesan daepok sakgam” 대북 정찰위성 예산 대폭 삭감 [Huge Cut of 
Budget for Surveillance Satellites Against North Korea], Yonhapnews, December 3, 2015. 
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Satellites Project Postponed] Korea Herald Business, October 5, 2016. 
193 Hyoung Joon An, “National Aspirations, Imaged Futures, and Space Exploration: the Origin and 
Development of Korean Space Program 1958–2013,” Dissertation, Georgia Institute of Technology 
(December 2015), 208. 
194 “South Korea’s First Astronaut Officially Quits,” Korea Times, August 12, 2014. 
http://www.koreatimesus.com/16153/.  
 65 
a major role in national security, should not be a case for national prestige. Otherwise, the 
sustainability of the space program will not be attained due to a waste of resources, 
excessive investments, and disorientation of technological development. 
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IV. THE EXTERNAL CASES 
This chapter examines Israel’s and Australia’s space programs as external 
comparative cases. To be specific, the historical space activities, such as the foundation 
of a space agency, satellite development, and launch vehicle construction, of each 
country will be dealt with first. Based on the major milestones of Israel’s and Australia’s 
space programs, this chapter will build an STL, which was provided by Wood’s and 
Weigel’s study, in order to find out the implications for the ROK. Next, the space policy, 
R&D investment, and human resources of each country will be studied. Through the 
study of space policy, R&D investment, and human resources, which are the same 
categories that were employed for the internal case study, the status of the ROK’s space 
programs will be substantiated in a comparative context. Finally, the chapter will analyze 
and compare the three countries in terms of the future direction of policy and investment. 
Israel’s and Australia’s space programs are useful cases for the ROK’s sustainable 
space development. Israel has ranked higher in the field of space even though its 
economic power is weaker than the ROK’s. On the other hand, Australia has less space 
power although its total GDP is similar to the ROK’s. These reciprocal trajectories of 
Israel and Australia should provide meaningful comparative reference points to inform 
the ROK’s space program and to decide which directions of policy and investment are 
sustainable. The existing literature mostly has viewed the ROK’s space program by 
contrasting it with those of the major space powers, such as the United States, Russia, or 
Japan. Accordingly, the ROK’s space ability has been analyzed as just an immature one 
which needs to expand quantitatively and qualitatively throughout all of its aspects. Yet it 
is hard to achieve growth of capability and capacity simultaneously due to the intricate 
considerations of available expenses and time. Moreover, a space industry has distinct 
features that are more sensitive than those present in the automobile industry or a 
semiconductor industry in terms of the size of the market, potential customers, level of 
maturity of its technologies, and political considerations. 
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A. ISRAEL’S SPACE PROGRAM 
1. History of Space Activities 
a. Space Agency 
The first space agency of Israel was the National Committee for Space Research 
(NCSR) founded in 1960. While the only distinguished space activity under the NCSR 
was launching of a solid fuel sounding rocket, Shavit-2, on July 1961, the NCSR has an 
important meaning as a space agency because it paved the way for the Israeli space 
program through space research and education.195 
Israel launched its space agency, the Israel Space Agency (ISA), which was 
established under the Ministry of Science and Development, in July 1983. ISA’s 
responsibilities included supervision and coordination of the national space efforts 
including space policy, collaboration with foreign countries, and scientific activities that 
involved Israeli academic institutions and industry.196 Although it had only four full-time 
employees and a $500,000 annual budget at the time of its foundation, ISA’s annual 
budget has since grown to $50 million.197 Its budget is relatively small when compared to 
other space faring nations’ budgets; however, the Israeli Ministry of Defense covers 
many satellite programs, the development of launch vehicles, and the operation of the 
Palmachim launch site.198 
b.  Satellites 
Israel has developed its satellites autonomously since the beginning of its satellite 
program. Historically, the major satellites of Israel have been the Ofeq spy sateliites, 
                                                 
195 Daphne Burleson, “Israel,” Space Programs Outside the United States (Jefferson, NC: McFarland 
& Company, Inc., 2005), 153. 
196 Deganit Paikowsky, et al., “Israel’s Space Strategy,” in Space Strategy in the 21st Century: Theory 
ad Policy, ed. Eligar Sadah (New York, NY: Routledge, 2013), 323. 
197 “Israel Space Agency,” Global Security, accessed October 31, 2016. 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/israel/agency.htm; Burleson, “Israel,” 153; Dan Fisher, “Israel 
Space Program Sets Lofty Goals: Security, Industrial Development Are Prime Concerns,” Los Angeles 
Times, June 10, 1985. 
198 “Israel Space Agency,” Global Security, accessed Oct 31, 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/
space/world/israel/agency.htm.  
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TechSAR, the Earth Resources Observation Satellite (EROS), and the Afro-
Mediterranean Orbital System (AMOS), according to ISA.199 
The first Israeli satellite was Ofeq-1, which was launched into orbit by Shavit 
launcher from the Palamchim launch site in Israel on September 19, 1988. Israel built and 
launched it without any foreign assistance.200 Along with Israel’s space aspiration, its 
purpose was to develop reconnaissance satellites, even though Ofeq-1 did not carry a 
camera. Afterwards, Ofeq-2 and -3 were launched and entered LEO successfully on April 
3, 1990, and April 15, 1995, respectively. At that time, Ofeq-3 was announced as a test 
satellite like the other satellites, as a matter of fact, it was a prototype for the Earth 
Resources Observation Satellite (EROS).201 On January 1998, Ofeq-4’s launching failed 
due to a malfunction of the Shavit-1 launch vehicle. However, overcoming the failure of 
Ofeq-4, Ofeq-5 was launched successfully on May 2002. Ofeq-5 had the capability of 
sending color imagery with less than 1 m resolution through a telescopic camera 
developed by Israeli enterprise, Elbit Systems.202 Afterward, the series of Ofeq continued 
to Ofeq-11, which was launched on September 2016. In addition, TechSAR, which is 
capable of delivering synthetic aperture radar image, was launched from India in 2008 
and 2010.  
On the other hand, the accumulated technologies and skills acquired during 
development of those spy satellites contributed to Israel’s commercial space capability. 
EROS-A was produced with Ofeq-3’s bus and launched by a Russian launch vehicle in 
2000, and it has an improved CCD electro-optic capability with a resolution of 5 ft.203 
EROS-B was launched in 2006 on a Russian Soyuz-Fregat launcher as well. Moreover, 
the communication satellites in the Afro-Mediterranean Orbital System (AMOS) were 
                                                 
199 ISA(2013), Israel Celebrates Space, Israel Ministry of Science and Technology, 8. 
200 Bruce A. By and Hurwitz. “Space Race Or Missile Gap?,” Jerusalem Post, December 14, 1989. 
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manufactured by the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI).204 AMOS-1 was launched by Ariane 
44L from Kourou on May 15, 1996, and AMOS-2 entered orbit from Kazakhstan in 2003. 
c. Launch Capability 
Israel has independent launch capability through its Shavit vehicle, which means a 
comet in Hebrew. Shavit was developed by domestic corporations entirely. The overall 
management was under the IAI, and components of the Shavit are also produced locally. 
Shavit consists of a three-stage solid propellant booster; the first and second stages, called 
Jericho-2, were created by TAAS, which is former Israel Military Industries, in the 1980s, 
and the third one was produced by Rafael, the Israeli Arms Development Research 
Authority.205 The Shavit blasted off in September 1988 for the first time.206 After that, 
several Israeli satellites, such as Ofeq, AMOS, EROS, and TechSAR, have been launched 
successfully by the Shavit.207 
Even though almost all Israel satellites have entered orbit via the Shavit, some 
satellites have relied on foreign launch vehicles due to the limited launch capacity of the 
Shavit and Israel’s unique geographical location. Shavit’s payload capacity to LEO is 
only 300 kg.208 Thus, heavy satellites like AMOS, which weighs nearly 1 ton, are not 
able to be launched by the Shavit. In addition, Israel has had to launch its rocket toward 
the northwest over the Mediterranean Sea from the launch site, the Palmachim Air Force 
Base, in order to prevent potential trouble with its neighboring countries to the east. This 
reverse course against the earth’s rotation requires more fuel consumption for entering 
satellite orbit and forces a specific operational orbital track.209 While it is trying to 
develop an enhanced launch vehicle with a more powerful upper stage motor so that is 
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able to load heavier payloads and place them in GEO, Israel has not yet tested such a 
system.210 
2. Policy 
Israel’s aspiration toward space activity was started by national security concerns 
due to threats from neighboring countries. According to Paikowsky, Israel’s space policy 
has mainly focused on capability for “early warning intelligence, deterrence, and self-
reliance in cutting-edge technologies.”211 The author argues that the starting point of 
Israel’s desire for independent space capability was the Yom Kippur War in 1973; during 
the war against Egypt and Syria, Israel wanted to get satellite intelligence from the U.S., 
but was denied.212 Even though the reason why the United States could not offer the 
information was a technical problem, Israel assessed that it was intentional.213 
Given this ambition, Israel has invested in independent space technologies for 
observation, reconnaissance, and communications. Based on such autonomous 
technologies－sovereign development of satellites and launching capability－Israel has 
raised its level of self-reliance. 
Recently, Israel has sought to expand its international cooperation. The main 
reason to engage in international cooperation is “to reduce the economic burden a space 
program entails,” Paikowsky argues. 214  Israel’s ongoing international cooperation 
projects are Vegetation and Environment New Micro Spacecraft (VENuS) with France, 
Mapping Using Synthetic Aperture Radar Mission (MUSAR) and Mediterranean Israel 
Dust Experiment (MEIDEX) with NASA, and hyperspectral scientific satellites project 
(SHALOM) with Italy. 215  Furthermore, Israel seeks to strengthen ties with foreign 
countries not only in the civil and commercial space fields but also on military side 
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regarding security. Israel signed a plan for “joint research grants and increased 
cooperation in space, cyber and information security” with Japan on January 4, 2015, 
even though the Israeli government announced that the plan is for the Israeli economy 
through market expansion.216 
3. Investment in R&D 
Israel has invested its budget into the space field intensively. In 2013, Israel’s 
space budget as a share of GDP was 0.034%, while the ROK invested 0.023%. 217 
However, exact statistics for Israel’s R&D budget expenditure for space programs are not 
available because they have not been announced publicly. 218  It is likely that a 
considerable part of the space program’s expenditures come from the defense budget; this 
amount is also confidential. According to Harvey, ISA’s annual space budget was 
approximately $70 million in the late 2000, and 90% of it was related to the Ministry of 
Defense’s technological program.219 In 2010, the newly enacted space plan’s annual 
budget was some $80 million.220 Moreover, a newspaper, which interviewed a director of 
the Israel Space Agency, says that “[Israel’s] aerospace industry continues to receive a 
substantial cash infusion from [its] $9 billion military budget,” even though it was in an 
economically hard time.221 
Yet the investment in space programs that can be estimated through other data 
sources seems substantial. According to the OECD, Israel’s Revealed Technological 
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Advantage (RTA) index in space-related technologies, which is defined as “a country’s 
share in patents in a particular field of technology, divided by the country’s share in all 
patents,” is 2.11 and ranked third in the world following 5.13 of Russia and 3.72 of 
France, while the ROK’s index is 0.77. 222  Moreover, OECD also observed that 
“aerospace is part of several high-tech activities which play a leading role in Israeli 
economic growth.”223 
Another index, that allows one to judge efforts of Israel’s R&D, is Gross 
Domestic Spending (GDS) on R&D. Total expenditure on R&D in terms of GDS has 
been reported to the OECD since 1991. According to the report, Israel spent $2.1 billion 
in 1991, and later on, it grew continuously to end with $10.4 billion in 2014; this figure is 
4% of Israel’s GDP total (see Figure 12).224  
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Figure 12.  Israel’s Gross Domestic Spending on R&D 
 
Source: OECD (2016), Gross domestic spending on R&D (indicator), accessed on October 21, 2016, doi: 
10.1787/d8b068b4-en.  
4. Human Resources 
Israel has reported its statistics on researchers to the OECD only twice, and the 
statistics were just their number per 1,000 people employed. According to the data, 15.7 
persons per 1,000 employed were researchers in 2011 and 17.4 persons in 2012. As is 
widely known, Israel claims its society is knowledge-based. While the quantity of 
available data is scanty, a headcount of researchers can be deduced reasonably as more 






































































B. AUSTRALIA’S SPACE PROGRAM 
1. History of space program 
a. Space Agency 
Australia does not have a national space agency.225 Historically, the Australian 
Space Office (ASO) was founded in 1987 under the Department of Industry, Technology 
and Commerce to support Australian Space Board (ASB) that directs the National Space 
Program of 1986.226 The Australian Space Council (ASC) was established and replaced 
the ASB in 1994 according to the Australian Space Council Act of 1994; however, the 
ASO and ASC were ceased in 1996 due to budget cuts.227 But still, the ASO’s role was 
limited to a secretariat. 
After that, some organizations have existed for research on space engineering in 
Australia. The Cooperative Research Centre for Satellite Systems (CRCSS) was founded 
in 1998. It is a multi-site joint venture of 6 universities, 4 private companies, and 2 
government agencies. 228  CRCSS was responsible for the FedSat project that is for 
scientific experiment. 229 CRCSS’s role in Australian space activity was unique. Jeff 
Kingweall argues that “there is no major Australian facility devoted to the process of 
providing an in-space platform to support scientific and engineering,” except the CRCSS; 
however, the CRCSS was closed in 2005.230 In addition, The Australian Space Research 
Institute (ASRI) was established in May 17, 1993; it is a non-profit organization, which 
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was founded through a merger between the Australian Space Engineering Research 
Association (ASERA) and the AUSROC Launch Vehicle Development Group.231 
Since the late 2000s, the necessity of establishing a national space agency has 
been raised again in Australia; but still, a space agency that takes charge of 
comprehensive supervision for a national space program does not exist. The Standing 
Committee on Economics of the Australian Senate in November 2008 argued that 
“Australia [would regain] an important place in global space science and industry by 
gradually developing a dedicated space agency.” 232  The report recommends an 
establishment of a space agency and Space Industry Advisory Council following other 
OECD countries’ cases.233 Based on these efforts, the Space Coordination Committee 
(SCC) was established for the purpose of enhancement of the Australian economy and 
social infrastructure through cooperation and coordination of the Australian agencies 
concerned to “the application of space technologies, particularly through the use of 
satellite information.” 234  The members of the committee include the Department of 
Industry, Department of Defense, Bureau of Meteorology, Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Office (CSIRO), and etc. 235  The competent authority of the 
committee is the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, and it is focused on 
civil and commercial space. In 2013, a Space Coordination Office was established under 
the Department of Industry, Innovation and Science to serve the purpose of 
administration.236 
                                                 
231 “About ASRI,” Australian Space Research Institute, accessed November 13, 2016. 
http://www.asri.org.au/About.  
232 Standing Committee on Economics of the Australian Senate, Lost in Space? Setting a New 
Direction for Australia’s Space Science and Industry Sector (Canberra, Australia: Senate Printing Unit, 
2008), 2. 
233 Ibid., 66. 
234 Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, “Civil Space Coordination,” 
Australian Government, accessed November 13, 2016. http://www.industry.gov.au/industry/
IndustrySectors/space/Civil-space-coordination/Pages/default.aspx.  
235 Ibid. 





Australia was the seventh country to launch and possess its own satellite from its 
territory. Despite this early achievement, Australia failed to maintain a sustainable path 
for the development of satellites. Jeff Kingwell argues that the “Australian public space 
endeavor has been characterized by a disconnected series of short-term projects and 
procurement contracts.”237 Kingwell cites the Weapons Research Establishment Satellite 
(WRESAT) and FedSat as examples of “disconnected series of short-term projects,” and 
Aussat series is a case of “procurement contracts.” 
The WRESAT was the first satellite launched in Australia. It was launched on a 
U.S. Sparta rocket from the Woomera launching range in Australia on November 29, 
1967. Even though its name contains weapons research, WRESAT was equipped only 
with scientific instruments for measurement of temperature, radiation, and ozone 
concentrations.238 Subsequently, Australia orbited its second satellite, Oscar-5, which 
was boosted on January 1970 and maintained the orbit for 43 days. 239 Oscar-5 was 
launched by a U.S. Thor-Delta rocket from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. 
 Aussat-1, also known as Optus A, which was launched in 1985, was the first GEO 
satellite of Australia. It was also the first nationally owned satellite for the purpose of 
communication. Aussat-1 and -2 were built by the Hughes company, and launched from 
the U.S. space shuttle. Moreover, Optus B, C, and D, which were also Aussat series, were 
built by Loral and Orbital Sciences, and launched by commercial launch providers. After 
that, ten Optus series satellites has been launched and owned by the Australian 
corporation, Optus. The most recent-launched satellite, Optus-10, was also developed by 
the U.S. Loral. 
                                                 
237 Kingwell, “Punching Below Its Weight,” 161. 
238 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 161. 
239 Ibid. 
 78 
Fedsat-1 was developed locally for the purpose of scientific experiments. It was 
developed by the CRCSS and launched on December 2002.240 But, as noted earlier, the 
end of the project, the CRCSS was abolished in 2005. 
c. Launch Capability 
Australia has various types of sounding rockets, but does not have autonomous 
space launch capability. Since 1949, almost 40 types of rockets have been developed and 
launched at the Woomera range in Australia, which was constructed by the UK as a firing 
range for missiles in the 1940s; however, no Australian satellite has been launched by an 
Australian launch vehicle. Moreover, Australia has not mapped a plan to build its own 
launch capability. Instead, Australia has boosted its satellites by European Ariane, 
Chinese Long March rockets, or the U.S. space shuttles and rockets. 
Australia has had favorable conditions to develop its own launch capability. Even 
though Australia successfully launched its own satellite, WRESAT, by the U.S. Redstone-
based Sparta launch vehicle in 1967, it did not link it with further projects. In particular, 
Australia rejected an offer to join the European Space Agency in 1972, when it was the 
only non-European member of the European Launcher Development Organization.241 
Consequently, Australia lost a chance to utilize European-built facilities at the Woomera 
launch site and skilled personnel for two decades until the commencement of the FedSat 
project.242  
Moreover, Australia has tried to develop commercial launch capacity; but it failed 
each time for various reasons. International facilities were planned to be constructed in 
Cape York, Christmas Island, and Woomera during the early 1990s to 2000s; but the 
plans were canceled because of problems of financing, aboriginal community’s protests, 
and technical failures of the spacecraft.243 
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2. Policy 
Australia has sought efficiencies in space policy through the utilization of foreign 
satellites and data. Australia’s geographical location has significantly affected its space 
policy. According to Australia’s Satellite Utilisation Policy, Australia relies on 
“international space systems to support critical civilian and national security functions” 
and accesses “international space systems in a fragmented fashion, depending on 
geographic advantages or the goodwill of other nations.”244 Australia’s unique location 
far from potential adversaries makes the country have fewer concerns about national 
security. Thus, Australia has had less interest in a spy satellite and has paid more 
attention to communication and meteorological satellites, which are relatively easy to 
purchase from a foreign country. Moreover, the space superpowers’ interest in the 
location of Australia also has affected Australia’s space policy. Located in the southern 
hemisphere, Australia is able to provide hosting services to other Western countries in 
terms of satellite observation systems through radar sites and other ground stations. Its 
spacious territory has also allowed other space powers to conduct experiments with 
missiles and launch vehicles at the Woomera range.  
However, Australia’s space policy is being shifted toward increased space 
capability. Recognizing the importance of space, Australia now emphasizes the 
significance of a space industry by stating principles to “focus on space applications of 
national significance, assure access to space capability, strengthen and increase 
international cooperation,” etc.245  
Moreover, Australia has increased military cooperation with the United States 
through the Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) communications system and the Space 
Situation Awareness (SSA) partnership. The WGS system consists of six satellites and 
improves “the communications support” to Australian “deployed forces in a cost 
                                                 
244 Commonwealth of Australia (2013), Australia’s Satellite Utilisation Policy, Department of 
Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education of Australia, 3. 
245 Ibid., 2. 
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effective manner.”246 Australia entered a partnership with the United States in 2007 to 
access the system. On the other hand, the SSA is for “the monitoring and tracking of 
orbiting space-based objects such as satellites and debris using ground-based radar and 
optical stations.” 247  Australia signed this bilateral treaty with the United States in 
2013.248 This international cooperation in the military space sector is able to be arranged 
due to Australia’s “favorable geographical location and abundant landmass.”249 
Yet still, Australian international engagement is toward programs related to 
infrastructure, such as space vehicle tracking and geospatial information, and its space 
policy does not contain space activities, such as satellite manufacturing, manned space 
flight, independent launch capability, and exploration to other planets.250 
3. Investment in R&D 
The space budget information of Australia is transparent; it has been reported 
near-biennially to international organizations like the OECD and World Bank. According 
to the data, Australian private sector’s investment in R&D for the aerospace industry has 
been limited. In 2001, only $2.9 million was invested in R&D by the Australian private 
sector, while the ROK’s expenditure was $621 million in the same year. 251  The 
Australian private sector’s R&D expenditure on the aerospace industry had increased to 
$81.8 million in 2006 as its peak, but it shrunk to $23.6 million in 2011 (see Figure 13). 
Moreover, the private sector’s R&D investment for the space industry was irregular when 
                                                 
246 Australian Department of Defense, “Wideband Global Satellite,” Defence Annual Report 2007–08. 
http://www.defence.gov.au/AunnualReports/07-08/vol2/ch3_02_wgs.htm.   
247 Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations, “Australia-United States Space Situational 
Awareness Partnership,” Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. http://dfat.gov.au/geo/
united-states-of-america/ausmin/Pages/australia-united-states-space-situational-awareness-
partnership.aspx.  
248 Deganit Paikowsky, Gil Baram, and Isaac Ben Israel, “Trends in Government Space Activity and 
Policy in 2013,” Astropolitics, 12, no.2-3. 109. DOI:10.1080/14777622.2014.961889.  
249 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 160. 
250 Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education of Australia, 
“International Engagement,” Austrian Government, accessed on November 1, 2016. 
http://www.industry.gov.au/industry/IndustrySectors/space/Civil-space-coordination/Pages/International-
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251 OECD.Stat, “Business Enterprise R-D Expenditure by Industry,” accessed October 28, 2016, 
http://stats.oecd.org. 
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compared with the total R&D budget of Australia. Australia’s GDS on R&D has also 
been reported biennially; contrary to the R&D expenditures by the private sector, it has 
been increased gradually (see Figure 13). The fact that aerospace R&D by the private 
sector is decreasing while domestic R&D spending is increasing shows that Australia’s 
space field is immature. 
Figure 13.  Australia’s R&D Spending 
 
Source: OECD (2016), Gross domestic spending on R&D (indicator), accessed on October 21, 2016, doi: 
10.1787/d8b068b4-en; OECD.Stat, “Business Enterprise R-D Expenditure by Industry,” accessed October 
28, 2016. http://stats.oecd.org. 
4. Human Resources 
Australia has scanty human resources in the R&D sector for a space industry. 
Data about air and space enterprises’ R&D personnel, which are reported to the OECD, 
shows that the average number of Australian space researchers from 2001 to 2011 was 
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Figure 14). On the other hand, the headcount of space researchers per 1,000 employed 
personnel was below nine until early in the 2010s.252 
Figure 14.  Australia’s R&D Human Resources in Aerospace industry 
 
Source: OECD.Stat, “Business Enterprise R-D Personnel by Industry,” accessed October 28, 2016. 
http://stats.oecd.org; data for 2002 is confidential.  
C. DIFFERENCES WITH THE ROK SPACE PROGRAM 
1. Early Aspirations for Space Capability Regarding Dependency 
The most significant difference among the three countries’ space programs 
derives from the early perspectives on space capability and the value or risks of 
dependency. In fact, the ROK’s starting point was in the middle of Israel’s and 
Australia’s case. The ROK selected two tracks: it sought to acquire international 
assistance in civil and commercial space in order to achieve its goals through a catch-up 
strategy as a latecomer, while it relied on foreign space capability, especially U.S. assets, 
for military purposes.  
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Israel’s main objective in its space programs was to achieve independent space 
capability in order to diminish national security concerns. To reach this goal, Israel 
focused on autonomous development of reconnaissance and communication satellites for 
military purposes. Moreover, Israel developed a self-reliant launch capability through its 
Shavit rocket and launch site on its territory, even though it has limitations on payload 
weight and selection of orbital direction due to Israel’s unique geographic location.  
By contrast, Australia has preferred a less costly client status for its space 
capability. Australia did not put an emphasis on independent space capability. The 
development of Australian satellites was not seen as a national security priority. Rather, 
Australia purchased satellites from foreign enterprises and profited by foreign satellite 
data in the fields of communication, broadcasting, and the environments of the 
atmosphere and the ocean. Instead, Australia offered Western space powers authorization 
to use its territory to build space observation and radar sites, as well as missile test ranges. 
This was the most affordable course that Australia could follow, because the interests of 
Australia and the interests of leading Western space-faring nations were quite compatible. 
The Milestone Timeline shows the results of the aspirations of the three countries 
well (see Figure 15). Following the foundation of a national space office and agency, 
Israel produced LEO and GEO satellites locally and launched a LEO satellite on its own 
launch vehicle. Except launch capability to GEO, which is hard to achieve for Israel due 
to its difficult location, Israel accomplished all of the top milestones. By contrast, 
Australia procured almost all of LEO and GEO satellites via purchase except some LEO 
satellites, WRESAT, Oscar-5 and Fedsat-1, and uses satellite data from foreign countries. 
Moreover, Australia has not established its own national space agency, but only has a 
Space Coordination Office for the purpose of administration in 2013. 
 84 
Figure 15.  Space Programs’ Milestone Timeline 
 
Adapted from Danielle Wood and Annalisa Weigel, “Charting the Evolution of Satellite Programs in 
Developing Countries – The Space Technology Ladder,” Space Policy 28 (2012), 16–17; added Israel and 
Australia’s data. 
2. Investment in Space 
The three countries also have different features in R&D investment in terms of 
budget and human resources. First of all, the ROK has invested in the space R&D sector 
irregularly according to the examination in Chapter III. On the other hand, Israel has 
invested reliably high expenditures to space based on its defense budget.  
Israel invested $2.8 billion in its total domestic R&D budget in 1994, and the 
amount of investment was increased $10.3 billion in 2014. When we look into the data of 
total Australian expenditures on R&D, it has put more money into R&D generally 
throughout the period of analysis; Australia’s total budget for R&D exceeds Israel’s at 
$8.3 billion in 1994 and $21.6 billion in 2014 (see solid lines in Figure 16). Israel has 
invested less than a half of the expenditures compared to Australia; however, Israel’s 
share of the R&D budget in GDP far exceeds Australia’s R&D share. While Australia’s 



































recent data shows that Israel maintains twice the investment in R&D in terms of its share 
of the R&D expenditures (see dash lines in Figure 16). It is hard to confirm that Israel has 
also a commensurate effort in space with data that fails to specify the space field itself. 
Nevertheless, we can estimate that Israel’s R&D efforts have been higher due to the facts 
of the Israeli space program’s characteristics, which are led by the government’s ample 
defense budget, relatively high level of space technology, and major role of the space 
industry in the Israeli economy. 
Figure 16.  Comparison of Expenditures on R&D by Country 
 
Source: OECD (2016), Gross domestic spending on R&D (indicator), accessed on October 21, 2016,. doi: 
10.1787/d8b068b4-en.  
In this regard, the ROK’s effort in R&D in terms of the share of the budget in 
GDP was also in the middle of the other two countries’ paths (see dotted line in Figure 
16). Moreover, it caught up to Israel in 2013 with more than 4% of GDP. But still, this 
does not necessarily mean that the ROK is putting more effort into R&D for space since 







































































































Moreover, the development of researchers in terms of total researchers per capita 
is also more mature in Israel than in the ROK or Australia, even though the number of 
ROK researchers has grown. Israel reported data of the number of researchers per 1,000 
employed personnel only two times in 2002 and 2003; however, the number of 17 
researchers per capita is considerably higher than the ROK’s six and Australia’s eight 
researchers per capita (see Figure 17). Here, the ROK shows rapid growth since the mid-
2000; however, the increase in the actual number of researchers in the ROK’s space 
sector is insignificant. According to the statistics for researchers of the ROK space 
industry from 2008 to 2014, when the KISTEP examined an aerospace industry divided 
into the aircraft, spacecraft, and its parts industry, the numbers are substantially the same 
(see Figure 6 in Chapter III). 
Figure 17.  Comparison of Researchers Per Capita by Country 
 







































































3. Transition among Dependency, Independency, and Cooperation 
All of the three countries are now in the process of transitions that are changing 
their initial space strategies. Even though each of the countries had a different starting 
point, particular direction, and incentive for change, they are moving within a framework 
of dependence, independence, and cooperation in trying to find their own sustainability in 
space activity (see Figure 18).  
Figure 18.  Transitions among Dependence, Independence, and Cooperation 
 
 
Israel has explicitly announced that it is expanding international cooperation. The 
area of cooperation, which Israel seeks to strengthen, is spread over the civil, commercial, 
and military areas. This transition is obviously breaking away from Israel’s initial space 
aspirations, which were to pursue independence, but is because of the economic burden 
of the space program and small domestic market. Moreover, Israel has favorable 
conditions for expanding cooperation. Advanced space technologies and skills, which 
were obtained through sufficient R&D investment, allow Israel to establish an 
advantageous position in international cooperation. Consequently, Israel is expected to 
succeed in its transition toward cooperation in civil and commercial space activities.  
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Australia also seeks to shift its objectives in space activity toward international 
cooperation, as it has announced in its national satellite utilization policy. However, the 
direction of Australia’s transition is the exact opposite to Israel’s course. Australia is 
pursuing international cooperation in order to escape from its long-lasting dependency in 
the space activity, because it realizes the importance of space capability. But Australia is 
mainly looking for space applications through international cooperation, not the 
acquisition of its own assets, such as satellites and launch vehicles. Even in military space, 
Australia is pursuing international cooperation through the WGS communications system 
and the SSA partnership with the United States. 
In contrast, the ROK’s movement started from a mid-point of dependence and 
cooperation to another intermediate point, between independence and cooperation. It 
plans to capture both economic and security interests. The direction is the same as 
Australia’s transition; however, its goal is closer to Israel’s final stage. In particular, 
launch capability and satellite manufacturing are the main fields that the ROK seeks for 
autonomy. Unlike Israel, however, the ROK is anticipating that it can achieve its goals 
based on space technology and know-how gained from foreign countries during past 
development projects related to satellites and launch vehicles. Still, low investment in 
R&D and human resources and lack of infrastructure are obstacles for these two lines of 
independence and cooperation when compared to Israel’s and Australia’s cases. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the space activities of Israel and Australia as external case 
studies to draw implications for the ROK’s space program. The thesis selected the two 
countries because of their space capabilities in contrast to their own economy: Israel, 
which has more space capabilities when compared to the size of its GDP, and Australia, 
which has less space capabilities considering the size of its GDP. This arrangement 
creates an expectation about the status of the ROK’s space program that lies midway 
between the two countries. Indeed, the ROK is in the middle of the two countries in terms 
of the path of its STL milestones, R&D investment, and development of human resources. 
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The most significant implication is that these phenomena are affected by a 
nation’s needs for space. The two countries began their space activities with different 
initial ambitions: Israel pursued its own development due to security concerns; Australia 
implemented a dependent space policy for economic benefits. Israel invested in space 
initially in order to acquire independent space capabilities; Australia did not invest as 
much as Israel did because it was able to access space through international assistance. 
Even in military space, Israel still can enjoy independence through its self-reliable 
satellites while it expands international cooperation in civil and commercial space; 
Australia seeks to assure access to military space capability through international 
cooperation.  
In this regard, the ROK should set a clear goal that it seeks to achieve through its 
space activities. The lesson learned in this chapter is not to copy the model of either Israel 
or Australia, but to draw a path toward a sustainable ROK space program in the future. 
The ROK has sought a stepping stone to prepare a transition toward autonomous space 
capabilities. According to the analysis in the Chapter III, however, it is still ambiguous 
whether the purpose to achieve space independence is for national security or national 
prestige. If the former is the real goal of the ROK, its path toward a sustainable space 
program should approach Israel’s model. Currently, the ROK’s destination of the policy 
transition is quasi-independence like Israel’s; however, the direction of the transition is 
noteworthy because it is the opposite direction to Israel’s changes today. Without 
abundant R&D investment and a mature level of space technologies through rich research 
in space like Israel has put in space activities, the ROK cannot reach its targeted point. 
Moreover, these efforts cannot achieve a favorable result in the short-term. 
At the same time, the ROK should pay attention to the international cooperation 
that Australia is benefiting from. It is more judicious for the ROK not to pursue all-out 
independent space capabilities in order to prevent the waste of its limited resources. 
Although the ROK is lacking in advantages of geolocation and size of territory like 
Australia has, it can use its strength in human resources based on a knowledge-based 
society and a solid alliance with its allies, especially the United States. 
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This thesis examined two internal cases, the automobile industry and the 
semiconductor industry, which are considered as successful industries of the ROK, and 
two external cases, Israel’s and Australia’s space activities, which are useful to compare 
with  the ROK’s. The purpose of these comparative studies was to answer the following 
research question: what are the challenges and opportunities facing the ROK in policy-
making and investment for establishing a sustainable space program? The findings here 
indicate that the ROK’s space development has had a similar trajectory to other 
successful industries but that insufficient efforts have been made in some areas, such as 
R&D investment in the private sector and human capital promotion. But the ROK still 
has opportunities in space development due to the strength of its technological 
competitiveness in niche markets; and it will be best served by maintaining a certain level 
of cooperation and engagement with its major ally, the United States. 
For the conceptualization of sustainability of space development, this thesis 
provided a definition of sustainability as a process of setting policy objectives, capital 
investment, and development of human resources to meet the need of a nation in space 
activities in an efficient manner in harmony with the country’s long-term support 
capabilities. Under this definition, three important factors for a sustainable space program 
were defined: policy, R&D investment, and human resources. Accordingly, both internal 
cases and external cases were analyzed in terms of these factors.  
The results of these comparisons are shown in the following table (see Table 3). 
In addition to the comparative results, this table has added analyses of the factor of 
sustainability, which is the most significant influencing element, in the ROK’s 
automobile industry and the semiconductor industry and Israel’s and Australia’s space 
activities. The main sustainability factor of the ROK’s space program, which left with a 
question mark, will be discussed in the final implications section.  
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Table 3.   Comparison Results of ROK Space Programs with  Case Studies 
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1. Comparative Study of Internal Cases 
Through a comparative study with the automobile industry and the semiconductor 
industry of the ROK, this thesis revealed three facts regarding the ROK’s space industry. 
First, the ROK’s space policy is not clear about its goal setting and investment direction 
compared with other industries. Next, R&D investment for the space industry and 
investment by private sector in particular have been insufficient in terms of steadiness 
and scale. Finally, the space industry has fewer researchers and R&D institutions, and the 
growth in their number is slower than in the other industries.  
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On the other hand, these experiences are affected by the fact that suspected 
ROK’s needs and aspirations toward space are national prestige rather than national 
security or the development of science and technology. The setting of policy objectives, 
capital investment, and development of human resources are influenced by a nation’s 
needs and aspirations. The ROK’s space policy emphasizes world ranking, but is 
characterized by poor investment by the private sector and few human resources, despite 
advanced technology. First, the amount of investment depends on specific space projects 
in order to achieve the targeted ranking, and the fact that the space industry is perceived 
as a government-led activity affects the investment climate. Next, the policy setting has 
raised uncertainties in decisions by private business on whether to invest or not. 
Accordingly, failure to attract investment by the private sector, unlike in the automobile 
industry and the semiconductor industry, also leads to a failure in human resource 
development. Consequently, this immaturity of private sector participation leads to a 
vicious circle that makes it hard to break the recognition that space is a government-led 
industry. Above all, this problem is well represented in the fact that there is no chaebol, 
which plays an important role in the Korean economy, in the space industry. 
This result will be an obstacle to a sustainable ROK space program in the future. 
Due to the fact that a space industry is related to not only the civil and commercial 
sectors but also military space, the space industry cannot be evaluated in the same way as 
other manufacturing industries; however, it also needs to have proper policy and 
investment, especially from private sector, in order to ensure future sustainability.  
2. Comparative Study of External Cases 
The three countries, Israel, Australia, and the ROK, have different starting points 
compared each other in their space policies in regard to dependency. Israel started its 
space program in order to solve concerns about national security and focused on military 
space capability at first. Australia relied on foreign assistance in order to fulfill its needs 
in civil, commercial, and military space activities from the beginning. The ROK 
commenced its space programs with international assistance as a stepping stone toward 
independent space capability in civil, commercial, and military space. 
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These origins of space aspirations affected each country’s performance in space 
programs. The three countries’ space programs in the STL show that each country’s goal 
for space activities was reflected in the outcomes. Israel has been steadfast in its ability to 
build and launch its own satellite by its own launch capability, beginning with the 
establishment of a national space agency. Australia, however, purchased most 
commercial satellites from foreign companies while it has had some intermittent satellite 
programs by its own. The absence of a national space agency and the lack of a plan for 
independent launch capability also come from the same reason. In contrast, the ROK has 
built its satellites locally based on technologies and skills acquired from international 
partners through initial programs for satellite development. 
Next, the level of R&D investment and development of human resources by each 
country has also been affected by the objectives of the three countries. Even though this 
thesis did not compare data of the space sector only (due to lack of data), it is clear that 
Israel has made a major investment in space in terms of funding and human resources 
based on other information. Israel maintains a high level of total R&D investment and 
number of total domestic personnel involved in research; Australia is the opposite of 
Israel; and the ROK’s beginning was similar to Australia’s, but it is now emulating and 
seeking to become more like Israel. However, this does not necessarily mean that the 
ROK’s efforts in the space sector have become sustainable due to the factors examined in 
Chapter III. 
Moreover, Israel and Australia are pursuing the expansion of international 
cooperation, although each country’s purpose of pursuing is different. The ROK is 
changing its policy direction; however, it seems to emphasize independent space 
capability, especially in military space and the launcher program. But, it is unclear how 
insufficient domestic R&D investment and human resources will affect the sustainability 
of the ROK’s space program. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS 
Four implications can be derived from these findings for the sustainability of the 
ROK’s space program. In order to take a path toward a sustainable space program, the 
ROK should: 
 Redefine national needs and aspirations for its space activities; 
 Plan to expand private investment, especially in space R&D; 
 Invest in the space sector with a long-term vision; and 
 Continue to strengthen ties with international partners.  
First of all, the most significant implication, which is derived from this thesis, is 
that sustainable space development should be based on clear goal setting. The selected 
elements for comparative analysis, R&D investment and human resources, are strongly 
influenced by the selection of national policy objectives. The two domestic industries that 
are selected as the internal cases were stimulated by private investment and developed 
human resources along with this investment. Even in the external cases, the performance 
of investment and human resource development in each country varied according to their 
policy direction. 
In this regard, the ROK should clarify the objectives of its space activity. As 
many studies have stated, national prestige could be one of the objectives that a country 
seeks to achieve; however, it is unlikely to achieve long-term sustainability when a 
government makes a space policy that orients performance only based on the objective of 
national prestige. National prestige could be a primary objective for the ROK due to its 
unique security environment, if the strategy provides relative security advantages through 
demonstrating advanced space capability ahead of its competitor. But, the ROK in fact 
interrupted its main astronaut program despite a large initial investment. The ROK should 
not aim to join the world’s top ten space powers, but instead should adopt a strategy that 
states clearly the specific purpose of space utilization to the country. 
Adoption of this objective also affects the private sector’s investment climate 
because investment stability has deteriorated. Moreover, the space industry is a hard area 
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to secure the profitability of private businesses. Few businesses are willing to invest in a 
space industry that lacks profitability as well as stability. Not surprisingly, the investment 
in the space industry by private sector in the ROK is considerably low. Thus, the space 
industry as a whole is affected easily by the government’s and public sector’s investment. 
In other words, inconsistent government R&D investment leads to instability of the 
whole market. Therefore, the expansion of private R & D investment is derived from the 
stability of the market based on the government’s consistent investment.  
In addition, the ROK should now find an alternative to its catch-up strategy, 
which drives the ROK to achieve space milestones in a relatively short period of time, 
and focus instead on long-term investment. In fact, the ROK is in an unfavorable 
situation to resist the temptation to adopt a catch-up strategy, because it is in a situation in 
Northeast Asia where security concerns are accelerated, it is confronting a major enemy 
(North Korea), and it is surrounded by advanced space powers. In this context, it is easy 
to feel impatience. However, as can be seen in the case of the ROK’s domestic industries 
and Israel’s space program, stable space capability is not achieved in a short period of 
time. 
Finally, the ROK must seek ways to expand international cooperation rather than 
pursue independent space capability. As shown in the case of Israel and Australia, each 
country changed the center of its policy direction toward international cooperation even 
though their key drivers are different. However, the ROK, which does not have the high 
technologies and skills of Israel or the advantageous geographical advantages of 
Australia, has few sustainability factors to pursue independence in its space activities. In 
this respect, the recent United States-Republic of Korea Framework Agreement for 
Cooperation in Aeronautics and the Exploration and Use of Airspace and Outer Space for 
Civil and Peaceful Purposes, which signed in April 27, 2016, and became effective in 
November 4, 2016, would be an appropriate opportunity to expand civil and commercial 
cooperation with the United States.253 This agreement calls for civil space cooperation 
                                                 
253 Diplomacy in Action, “United States-Republic of Korea Framework Agreement for Cooperation in 
Aeronautics and the Exploration and Use of Airspace and Outer Space for Civil and Peaceful Purposes,” 
accessed in November 16, 2012, U.S. Department of States. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2016/04/
256625.htm.  
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between the two countries by “exchanges of scientific data and exchanges of scientists, 
engineers, or other experts” among implementing agencies, such as NASA, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), KARI, KASIAT, and the Korea 
Meteorological Administration (KMA).254 In addition to this, the ROK should look for 
more engaged cooperation in the field of military space, as in the case of Australia’s SSA 
partnership or WGS communication systems. An attempt toward autonomous military 
space capability without ripe space technologies, unlike Israel’s case, can undermine the 
sustainability of space development because a lot of resources and efforts are consumed. 
In particular, it is expected that an astronomical budget will be put in place for the 
independent construction of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and the Korea 
Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR), which the ROK military is currently 
pursuing against North Korea’s threats. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The future of space activities of the ROK is not as pessimistic as some of the 
conclusions of this thesis may seem to indicate. The criticisms about the prospects for 
sustainable growth in the ROK’s space program aim to provide the basis for hopeful 
suggestions for successful development and increased sustainability. While there may be 
many concerns, it is clear that the ROK has grown remarkably in the space sector in a 
short time and still has the potential for growth. But it is time for a new phase. To enter 
that phase, the only thing that the ROK needs to clarify is what it wants to derive from its 
space activities. 
The conclusions of this thesis thus also highlight the next major question: what 
exactly is the niche market on which the ROK’s space program should concentrate to 
establish its sustainability? To find this niche, the needs of the international space market 
and the capabilities of the domestic space industry should be judged appropriately. 
Considering the domestic market alone, manufacturing satellites and launch vehicles is 
hardly profitable. Except in the broadcasting communication sector, the small size of the 
ROK’s domestic space market makes it difficult for private enterprises to expect a profit. 
                                                 
254 Ibid. 
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In addition, the ROK’s launch vehicle business has a limitation due to the fact that 
leading countries’ experience, price, and current market share are hard to compete with. 
Instead, the sale of imagery from low-cost small satellites might be a niche market for the 
ROK space industry because the large international companies have little activity in the 
field thus far.255  
In summary, as Moltz argues, the ROK faces a difficult challenge to “catch up 
and maintain a competitive position in all space-related areas” due to “its economy and 
resource base.”256 Therefore, finding its own niche market is important for a sustainable 
ROK space program that avoids wasting resources and other efforts.  
                                                 
255 Korea Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning, “Segyesijang Bunseokae Gichohan Ujubunya 
Sanubhwa Jeonryak maryun” 세계시장분석에 기초한 우주분야 산업화 전략 마련 [Industrialization 





256 Moltz, Asia’s Space Race, 156. 
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APPENDIX A. COMPARISON OF R&D BUDGETS 
KRW (Million, Current Currency) 
Year 
Automobile Semiconductor† Air and Space†† 
Total Private Total Private Total Private 
1998 1,468,998 1,432,891 970,770 926,964 20,672 15,601 
1999 1,124,193 1,067,360 1,425,252 1,323,595 182 182 
2000 1,465,764 1,430,729 1,045,313 986,362 302,503 81,179 
2001 1,411,568 1,386,235 3,537,426 3,406,582 470,316 128,778 
2002 1,641,989 1,618,439 3,933,496 3,834,160 239,827 14,961 
2003 1,981,118 1,951,900 4,407,388 4,278,857 80,705 21,378 
2004 2,498,065 2,448,972 5,946,556 5,857,141 196,897 107,388 
2005 2,790,318 2,737,711 6,452,180 6,352,535 130,531 103,711 
2006 3,198,703 3,133,570 7,430,724 7,338,991 168,826 127,646 
2007 3,831,826 3,770,214 7,623,679 7,466,651 183,083 126,072 
2008 3,442,680 3,350,393 7,478,411 7,427,296 28,527 10,041 
2009 3,532,498 3,370,950 8,203,148 8,076,885 69,020 45,897 
2010 3,999,724 3,833,602 10,186,323 10,096,163 70,269 51,439 
2011 4,537,290 4,381,186 11,482,440 11,387,494 77,949 61,595 
2012 4,893,457 4,752,010 13,368,737 13,247,596 158,721 13,186 
2013 5,276,408 5,121,877 16,315,293 16,245,667 123,903 15,588 
2014 5,876,278 5,709,687 16,805,069 16,731,974 75,492 39,508 
†Electronic components industry including the semiconductors (before 2007), Semiconductor industry only 
(after 2008). ††Aerospace industry (before 2007), Aircraft, Spacecraft, and its parts industry (after 2008). 
Source: Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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Researchers Degree (Person) 
Doctor Master Bachelor 
1998 130 10,669 221 2,264 6,485 
1999 152 10,080 192 2,353 7,057 
2000 193 10,520 171 2,607 7,136 
2001 217 9,483 242 2,426 6,274 
2002 239 10,381 345 2,362 6,799 
2003 251 12,154 360 3,010 8,142 
2004 289 14,193 362 3,584 9,597 
2005 277 15,486 463 3,949 10,584 
2006 370 18,125 573 4,296 12,449 
2007 479 19,597 506 4,494 13,946 
2008 585 20,930 704 4,822 14,646 
2009 663 20,890 726 4,848 14,522 
2010 686 22,191 626 5,118 15,178 
2011 789 24,724 730 5,427 17,704 
2012 932 27,582 797 5,800 19,479 
2013 991 28,261 815 6,129 20,309 
2014 1,215 30,842 847 6,626 22,233 
Source: Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of Research and 
Development in Science and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology. 
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Researchers Degree (Person) 
Doctor Master Bachelor 
1998 111 8,755 602 2,867 4,995 
1999 160 7,617 568 2,685 3,898 
2000 303 8,190 643 2,737 4,359 
2001 397 24,687 1,911 7,129 13,280 
2002 454 26,897 1,961 8,052 14,449 
2003 456 29,922 2,455 9,351 15,708 
2004 486 35,271 2,951 11,097 19,824 
2005 454 41,740 3,687 12,828 21,729 
2006 588 48,015 4,153 14,196 25,967 
2007† 684 49,937 4,322 14,611 27,270 
2008†† 219 41,465 3,682 11,963 22,698 
2009 262 42,547 3,828 12,207 23,322 
2010 263 47,334 4,364 13,375 26,196 
2011 289 50,488 4,782 14,083 28,016 
2012 330 49,974 4,907 13,965 27,647 
2013 328 51,855 5,218 13,911 28,919 
2014 347 54,335 5,504 14,059 30,642 
†Electronic components industry including the semiconductors (before 2007). ††Semiconductor industry 
only (after 2008). Source: Korea Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of 
Research and Development in Science and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology 
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Researchers Degree (Person) 
Doctor Master Bachelor 
1998 3 239 25 103 108 
1999 1 3 0 0 3 
2000 7 699 29 228 438 
2001 16 1,243 77 443 679 
2002 13 938 46 340 546 
2003 17 836 46 340 445 
2004 19 867 49 314 470 
2005 18 1,455 64 523 796 
2006 21 1,587 63 580 858 
2007† 23 1,631 85 622 884 
2008†† 23 1,033 31 370 582 
2009 30 1,142 14 386 678 
2010 29 1,057 38 411 571 
2011 33 1,210 43 459 652 
2012 40 1,304 49 511 680 
2013 45 1,107 35 435 597 
2014 57 1,294 48 490 696 
†Aerospace industry (before 2007). ††Aircraft, Spacecraft, and its parts industry (after 2008). Source: Korea 
Institute of S&T Evaluation and Planning, “Report on the Survey of Research and Development in Science 
and Technology,” ROK Ministry of Science and Technology 
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APPENDIX E. R&D INVESTMENT, ISRAEL AND AUSTRALIA 
Year 
 Israel Australia 
Gross Domestic 
Spending on R&D 
(Million USD) 
Sharing of  GDP 
on R&D 





Sharing of  GDP 
on R&D  
(% of GDP) 
Business 
Enterprise R&D 
in Space  
(Million USD) 
1991 2,134 † 7,451 † † 
1992 2,358 † † † † 
1993 2,562 2.384 † † † 
1994 2,812 2.436 8,309 1.507 † 
1995 3,007 2.444 † † † 
1996 3,391 2,596 9,413 1.580 † 
1997 3,822 2.811 † † † 
1998 4,414 2.921 9,396 1.437 † 
1999 4,893 3.327 † † † 
2000 6,299 3.932 10,219 1.477 † 
2001 6,721 4.185 † † 2.9 
2002 6,631 4.132 12,219 1.649 † 
2003 6,332 3.9 † † 27.3 
2004 6,614 3.875 13,788 1.732 † 
2005 7,197 4.039 † † 39.2 
2006 7,782 4.128 17,048 2.004 81.8 
2007 8,818 4.407 † † † 
2008 8,926 4.329 20,198 2.248 50.7 
2009 8,605 4.121 † † 45.5 
2010 8,659 3.930 20,572 2.192 36.8 
2011 9,282 4.011 20,646 2.123 23.6 
2012 9,829 4.129 † † † 
2013 10,049 4.088 21,563 2.112 † 
2014 10,358 † † † † 
†: No data for various reasons. . All data are shown as current currency. Source: OECD (2016), Gross 
domestic spending on R&D (indicator), accessed on October 21, 2016, doi: 10.1787/d8b068b4-en 
(Accessed on 21 October 2016). 
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APPENDIX F.  HUMAN RESOURCES  
Year 
Researcher Per Capita 






Israel ROK Austria Australia’s Space Industry 
1994 † † 7.05 † † 
1995 † 4.925 † † † 
1996 † 4.772 7.311 † † 
1997 † 4.842 † † † 
1998 † 4.646 7.316 † † 
1999 † 4.943 † † † 
2000 † 5.127 7.342 † † 
2001 † 6.324 † 27 9 
2002 15.705 6.407 7.826 † † 
2003 17.378 6.839 † 331 160 
2004 † 6.926 8.341 63 25 
2005 † 7.867 † 298 187 
2006 † 8.639 8.459 569 352 
2007 † 9.471 † 368 231 
2008 † 10.015 8.562 363 245 
2009 † 10.384 † 301 223 
2010 † 11.084 8.982 242 179 
2011 † 11.916 † 210 63 
2012 † 12.787 † † † 
2013 † 12.840 † † † 
2014 † 13.495 † † † 
†: No data for various reasons. Source: OECD (2016), Researchers (indicator), accessed on October 21, 
2016, doi: 10.1787/20ddfb0f-en.    
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